The Hidden Costs of Visible Support: A Field Experiment on Coaching and Women's Economic Empowerment*

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January 10, 2026

Abstract

Coaching is central to economic inclusion programs, but standard delivery methods may backfire. We randomize 940 Ugandan women into classroom-based business training with home visits, coaching at the training venue, or control. Despite equal skill acquisition, venue-based coaching generates more persistent business performance gains. We argue that this is because home visits increase visibility of program participation, leading to increases in women's network centrality. Visibility changes the intrahousehold information environment, significantly reducing women's economic decision-making power but also reducing IPV by 40% relative to venue-based coaching. Coaching modalities trigger social dynamics that matter for program effectiveness.

Keywords: Coaching, Women's Economic Empowerment, Intrahousehold Dynamics, Intimate Partner Violence, Entrepreneurship Training.
JEL Codes: D13, D23, D91, J16, O12.

*We are grateful to Irene Namaganda, and a large team of enumerators, who were vital in the successful completion of this project in the field. Without their dedication, this paper would not have been possible. We also thank the team of coaches of our implementation partner in Uganda. We thank Catalina Duran, and Jennifer Liu for excellent research assistance. We are highly indebted to Catia Batista and Jeremy Magruder for support and guidance throughout this project. This paper benefited from comments by Kathleen Beegle, Claire Duquennois, Karl Dunkle-Werner, Gabriel Englander, Erin Kelley, Sylvie Lambert, David McKenzie, Juan Vargas, Ines Vilela, Selim Gulesci, and participants at various conferences and seminars. We wish to acknowledge financial support from the Argidius Foundation through the Innovation Growth Lab and the G2LM|LIC Gender, Growth, and Labour Markets in Low Income Countries Program. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are solely those of the authors and should not be construed as representing the opinions or policies of the sponsoring agencies. This study is pre-registered with the AEA registry (#AEARCTR-0007212). It has approval from the Ugandan National Ethics Committee (REF 0207-2018) and IRB approval in the U.S. (U.C. Berkeley CPHS 2018-04-10959).

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1 Introduction

Individual coaching is viewed as an important tool for teaching skills or reinforcing skill acquisition across a host of domains. As a consequence, many programs in low-income countries include home visits (e.g., Banerjee et al. (2015); Bandiera et al. (2017)). A priori, home visits appear optimal for maximizing human capital accumulation: they provide coaches with superior information through direct observation without burdening participants with travel costs. It follows that home visits should lead to larger impacts than an alternative model where participants must travel to a training center, as lower participant costs and better information for coaches should translate into higher skills and profits.

Focusing solely on participant convenience and program delivery fails to account for the social environment where skills-based programs operate. When program participation is observable to community and household members, it may affect how others interact with participants. A growing literature documents that individuals in low-income settings face pressure to share resources with their social networks and that this pressure intensifies when economic gains become visible (e.g., Carranza et al. (2025)). Home visits, by design, make program participation observable to neighbors and family members who see coaches arrive, and to broader networks through word of mouth. If visibility generates costs similar to those documented for resource gains, the standard logic favoring home visits may be incomplete.

We test whether coaching modality affects program outcomes using a randomized controlled trial with 940 women in central Uganda. The program we study typically uses home visits as a way to reinforce business skills taught in classroom modules and to provide tailored feedback to the women participating. We randomly assign women to one of three arms: a control group without any intervention, the traditional "home-visit" treatment, and a novel "venue-based coaching" treatment, in which women can still access one-on-one coaching but must travel to the training venue on designated days to do so. Crucially, the curriculum and the quantity of available coaching are identical across treatment arms. This design allows us

to isolate the impact of the coaching location from the content of the training.

Our results contradict the standard prediction. Although home visits achieve higher compliance (women attend significantly more coaching sessions), venue-based coaching leads to larger and more persistent improvements in business performance one year after the program ends. The gap in business performance is not driven by differences in learning. Both groups demonstrate nearly identical skill acquisition at program graduation, and attendance in classroom modules does not differ between treatments.

We argue that the gap in business performance is driven by the visibility of home visits, which expose women to community and household pressures that hinder business success. First, we show that home visits persistently increase a woman's network centrality, indicating that women assigned to home visits become more known in their communities than those assigned to venue-based coaching. This community visibility is costly: women assigned to home visits are 18% more likely to report being robbed than those assigned to venue-based coaching. Second, visibility leads to information sharing in the household. Spouses of home-visit participants develop significantly more accurate estimates of their wives' earnings than those in venue-based coaching, eroding the privacy that women rely on to maintain control over economic resources. Consequently, women assigned to home visits report significantly lower economic autonomy, including less say over how earnings are spent and a more than double likelihood of having a joint bank account with their spouse relative to women in venue-based coaching.

We find that lower economic autonomy among women assigned to home visits does not stem from forceful expropriation. In fact, our results show that women in the home-visit arm experience 40% lower rates of intimate partner violence (IPV) than those assigned to the control group and venue-based coaching. Visible program participation appears to alter the household information environment: men know about women's program participation and economic activities, but are also likely aware that women are better known in the community. The result is a bargaining equilibrium where women gain physical well-being but lose

economic autonomy.

Our paper establishes three novel facts about the relationship between coaching modalities and women's economic empowerment in low-income settings. First, we provide experimental evidence that coaching modalities affect economic outcomes despite achieving equal skill acquisition. Second, we show that the visibility of program participation undermines economic empowerment by shifting women's network positions and household information environments. Third, we document the resulting household equilibrium in which women lose economic autonomy but benefit from reduced intimate partner violence. These findings reveal critical design considerations for programs targeting women's economic empowerment. They also suggest a new avenue for reconciling mixed results in the entrepreneurship training literature.

A large literature shows that women take extensive effort to hide economic resources and preserve autonomy (S. Anderson and Baland (2002); Ashraf (2009); Castilla and Walker (2013); Hoel (2015); Aker et al. (2016); Riley (2024); Greco et al. (2025)). We provide novel evidence on strategic resource hiding by showing that observably acquiring new skills can trigger the same household and social dynamics as acquiring cash. Recent work has uncovered a key mechanism underlying this behavior by documenting the effects of "social taxes" on entrepreneurial and labor supply decisions (Jakiela and Ozier (2016); Squires (2024); Carranza et al. (2025)). Our results suggest that the visibility of program participation itself can generate similar pressure. This implies that making skill acquisition observable can inadvertently expose women to household and social pressure before returns to human capital accumulation are even realized. If these pressures prevent women from applying their newly acquired skills, the economic benefits from skills-based programs may be minimal.

We additionally contribute evidence on the complex bargaining processes that affect women's economic empowerment and IPV. Classic household bargaining models predict that improving women's outside option strengthens their bargaining position, which increases their economic decision-making power and reduces violence (Becker (1965); Manser and Brown

(1980); McElroy and Horney (1981); Lundberg and Pollak (1993); Hidrobo and Fernald (2013); Heath (2014)). Conversely, theories of backlash suggest that as women gain economic independence, partners use violence to regain control, ultimately reducing women's economic autonomy (Haushofer et al. (2019); Dulhunty (2025)). We document that household dynamics can change before a woman has even realized a new outside option if her spouse becomes aware that she is taking actions to increase her autonomy. In our case, this leads to lower violence alongside reduced economic autonomy for women assigned to home visits, but not those assigned to venue-based coaching, for whom autonomy and IPV remain unchanged relative to the control group. Our results highlight that the impact of women's empowerment programs depends critically on the information environment.

Finally, our results speak to the broader debate on the effectiveness of entrepreneurship training. Current evidence documents mixed results from entrepreneurship training on poverty alleviation, with effects varying considerably across contexts and populations (D. McKenzie and Woodruff (2014); D. McKenzie (2021); D. McKenzie, Woodruff, et al. (2025)). Our results show that design features intended to maximize compliance (home visits) may inadvertently hinder program success. Our evidence suggests that business and entrepreneurship skills are binding constraints for low-income women in rural Uganda, consistent with Calderon, Cunha, and Giorgi (2020) and Bakhtiar, Bastian, and Goldstein (2022). When women have the opportunity to apply newly learned skills, they start and grow profitable enterprises. However, program effectiveness is strongly mediated by coaching modality. By showing that a standard program feature can eliminate economic returns by increasing social frictions, we highlight that participant privacy is a key production input.

Our findings challenge how we evaluate and design economic empowerment programs for women in rural settings. Standard considerations favor home visits: they achieve higher compliance with greater convenience for program participants. We demonstrate that social frictions can override these logistical advantages.

2 Background and Context

Based on the 2018 Living Standards and Measurement Survey (LSMS) in Uganda, 74% of rural women are employed in some form of productive activity (including paid work, self-employment, and unpaid work in family businesses). Thirteen percent of rural women engage in self-employment. In central Uganda, the region where our study is based, average daily household expenditures are UGX 22,258 (USD 5.66 with a median of UGX 16,556) per household, and the median household size is four.

The women in our sample reside in five communities. Our implementing partner selected all study locations based on conversations with community leaders, their evaluation of the economic needs of the communities, and their estimate of the population of women who might be interested in participating.[1] Of the five communities where we worked, four are rural and one is peri-urban.

On average, 54% of women in our sample report working for at least part of their time in their own business at baseline, with median monthly profits of UGX 50,000 (USD 13.78). The most common types of businesses are those selling food products, both perishable and non-perishable, but around 7% of women also have businesses raising livestock, selling charcoal, vending clothes, and selling drinks. For context, women report median daily expenditures of UGX 5,900 (USD 1.63) in their households at baseline with a median household size of 4, indicating that the women in our sample tend to be poorer than the average rural household in central Uganda.

Beyond economic constraints, women in our context face high rates of gender-based violence. Rates in Uganda are some of the highest in the world. As of 2020, 95% of Ugandan women reported experiencing physical or sexual violence during their lifetime (Wilman, Atamanov, and Myers (2022)). According to this data (collected as part of the Ugandan National

[1] Allowing our partner to select the study locations precludes random site selection; however, we argue that it yields representative study sites given that the program we study and others like it are unlikely to work in communities that are uninterested in participating or otherwise unable to participate.

Household Survey), 56% of ever-partnered women between 15 and 49 years old experienced abuse from their spouse at some point in their life. Almost 35% experienced intimate partner violence (IPV) over the last 12 months.[2]

Partnered women in our sample report similar experiences of IPV. Around 59% of women have experienced physical or sexual abuse during their lifetime, with 40% experiencing it over the last 12 months. Our data also partially reflect impacts from the second COVID-19 lockdown in Uganda, while the Ugandan National Household Survey only captures impacts from the first COVID-19 lockdown.[3]

Women in our sample have relatively high control over the income they generate themselves at baseline. Around 99% of women in the control group report that they alone or jointly with their spouse decide how the money women earn will be used. In contrast, only one-third of the women report sole or joint decision-making power over spouses' earnings. Overall, this suggests that women in our sample have relatively little economic autonomy. While they (jointly) control their own resources, these resources are limited and unstable, and they have little control over other household resources.

Social networks in Uganda tend to be dense and organized around kinship ties. Larson, Lewis, and Rodriguez (2022) document that network centrality in Uganda plays a crucial role for information dissemination. Regular home visits were the most frequently used channel for information diffusion. This suggests that program participation visibility may quickly spread and become community knowledge when coaches visit women's homes or businesses.

[2]For comparison, 20% of women in Sub-Saharan Africa experienced IPV over the last 12 months (WHO (2021)).

[3]Our endline survey, the only time we measured IPV, took place after the second COVID-19 lockdown in Uganda for roughly half of the women in our sample. See Figure A1 for further timeline information.

3 Experimental Design

3.1 Treatment

We randomly assign women in our sample to two different arms of an entrepreneurship program or a control group. The program we study is called "Street Business School" (SBS). Over the course of approximately six months, coaches from SBS delivered eight training modules to all treated women through classroom sessions. These covered topics such as identifying business opportunities, bookkeeping, business planning, and money management, among others.[4] Crucially, the content of modules and quantity of available coaching sessions are the same across treatment groups.

The first month focuses on teaching skills to start enterprises and on increasing women's beliefs in their abilities. In the second month, the program schedules two modules on management practices. The third month only has one module on skills: business planning. While the first three months focus on starting and running a business, the last three months of the program focus on teaching skills for firm growth. Month five is entirely dedicated to implementation. Ideally, participants start or continue working on their business in this month using the skills they have learned. The program ends with a formal, public graduation ceremony to celebrate the achievements of the women who participated. Before the ceremony, women walk through the village in a celebration. At the ceremony, program coaches call women individually and award certificates for successfully completing the program.[5] While the public graduation ceremony ensures that *completed* program participation becomes visible eventually, home visits create additional, ongoing visibility throughout the six-month program period.

The variation between the two treatment groups comes from differences in coaching modalities. In the home-visit arm, NGO coaches attempted to schedule three one-on-one

[4]For the complete module-by-module content, see Table A1.

[5]Women have to attend at least four of the eight modules to receive the certificate.

visits at the participant's home or business over the six months of the program. In the venue-based coaching arm, program coaches designated days when they would be available at the training venue if participants wanted to speak with them. Venue-based coaching can be a viable alternative to home visits that maintains benefits from being in-person (especially as our target population's access to alternative technologies is limited) while also protecting privacy around program participation. However, venue-based coaching comes with concerns around the uptake of coaching, which might affect program effectiveness.

SBS incorporates successful elements from personal initiative training as described in Campos et al. (2017) and the ILO's Start and Improve Your Business (SIYB) program, but it differs in some aspects. The program explicitly targets women: chants of female empowerment and female role models in the form of program alumni are a substantial part of the training, and all program coaches are women. Although SIYB does provide after-training support, its implementation is less structured and it is unclear where coaching visits are provided. Lastly, SBS falls at the low end of comparable business trainings in terms of the time participants spend in the classroom: a maximum of around 20 hours, including all classroom and potential coaching sessions. For comparison, D. McKenzie, Woodruff, et al. (2025) estimates that most traditional business trainings involve 3-12 full days of instruction.

3.2 Sampling Frame

Our implementation partner recruited participants in each of our five study locations over several days. Program coaches undertook the same type of mobilization they typically do, but over a slightly larger area to accommodate the sample required for the RCT. Coaches mobilize in a new community by speaking with community leaders and visiting households to inform them about the program. During these efforts, coaches emphasize that the program does not provide any direct financial assistance but offers skills training and guidance on how to become a successful entrepreneur. Coaches then invite all women interested in the

program to an orientation day at a central location. There are no restrictions on who can participate other than gender.

Orientation aims to convince motivated women to enroll in the program. Coaches explain the structure of the six months, the official graduation ceremony, and bring successful alumni to share their stories, but they also emphasize that each woman is responsible for working hard to make her business successful. As such, the women who choose to sign up for the program have detailed information about the types of activities that the program will entail. During the orientation, the RCT project manager also introduced the study and explained that by signing up to participate, the women would be randomly assigned to different groups. She emphasized that all groups would eventually get to participate in the program but that some would be asked to wait until the end of the study.

After the orientation meeting, we enrolled all interested women in the study by collecting their contact details, obtaining media consent, and taking pictures of all women. With these pictures, we print photobooks to identify social network connections between women at baseline, midline, and endline within each location.

Our sampling strategy maintains the self-selection that typically occurs at the start of the program. Although self-selection into the program has implications for the external validity of our results for the entire population of women in Uganda, our results are externally valid for the subset of rural women interested in increasing their income through entrepreneurship.

In total, we enrolled 940 women in five different communities over the course of fifteen months (August 2018–October 2019). Capacity constraints prevented us from working in more than one location at once, which is why we enrolled the sample over time. This means that we effectively stratify on location, though the strata are not precisely equal in size. Our sample consists of 163 women in the first location, 220 in the second, 185 in the third, 217 in the fourth, and 155 in the fifth.

Our sample for analyzing intrahousehold effects is composed of partnered women from four

of the five locations.[6] Partnership status was not a selection criterion for study participation. Formally, our intrahousehold sample is women who reported being partnered (married or cohabiting) at baseline and who were interviewed at endline: 446 participants.

3.3 Assignment to Treatment

We implemented a temporarily double-blind, individual-level randomization to one of three arms (control, home visits, or venue-based coaching) at the end of the baseline survey. The enumerator asked each woman to draw a colored candy from a paper bag. Women received a matching colored paper with information about the time, date, and venue of the first training session. Whereas time and date were the same for all three groups, the venue differed depending on treatment status. We did not reveal to participants which venue corresponded to each treatment until the first day of training when they were at the venue. We changed the color of the candies corresponding to each group in each new location and never revealed the correspondence to enumerators.[7] The randomization is temporarily double blind in the sense that women knew after the first day of training which group they had been assigned to, and all program coaches knew which group they were coaching.

Although the control group did not receive any training during the RCT, they took part in a placebo activity during the very first day of the program where we invited them to a designated venue to get to know each other and ask questions to the research staff regarding when they would be eligible to participate in the program. The placebo activity assisted with treatment compliance and allowed us to re-explain the process of randomization so that we addressed any concerns about fairness from women in the control group before the program was already underway.

[6]We only have data on IPV and decision-making power for four locations. This is due to funding constraints – we only obtained funding to study impacts on intimate partner violence and household dynamics after concluding endline data collection in the first location.

[7]Note that the number of women in treatment and control is not precisely even as a result of random chance.

Program coaches took careful attendance to ensure compliance with treatment. Monitoring from the coaches limited non-compliance to 1.4%. This stems from a small number of women in the control group attending a classroom session at some point during the training, although they did not receive any coaching. We therefore present results showing intent-to-treat estimates based on the randomly assigned treatments, but note that instrumenting for each participant's actual group with their treatment assignment yields qualitatively similar results.[8] Only 6.4% of women assigned to treatment never attended a module. Compliance with assignment to different coaching modalities is 100% because program coaches did not schedule home visits with any women assigned to venue-based coaching and did not accept women assigned to home visits during venue-based coaching sessions.

We check for baseline balance on age, marital status, educational attainment, parental educational attainment, employment status, household size, number of minors, business ownership, network size, and select psychometric measures. We test for selective attrition along the same dimensions. The groups are generally balanced (see Table A2). We observe a slight imbalance on education levels but this is in line with what we would expect by chance given the number of covariates we test. Women in the control group are slightly less likely to have obtained secondary education, which we control for in our analyses. Attrition is 10% at both midline and endline and is not correlated with treatment status. Attrition is correlated with some baseline covariates: women with lower levels of formal education are significantly less likely to drop out of the sample than those with higher levels of education. Younger women are more likely to drop out; however effect sizes are not economically meaningful (see Table A3).

[8]Results instrumenting for actual treatment with treatment assignment are available upon request.

3.4 Data

We conducted three in-person surveys with each woman in our sample: once at baseline in the two weeks following orientation, once at midline in the 2–3 weeks following graduation, and once at endline 12–18 months after graduation.[9] In the first four locations, all treatment activities finished prior to the first COVID lockdown. The first lockdown delayed graduation in our fifth location. The timeline highlights two important considerations. First, we had originally intended to collect endline data 18 months after the baseline survey, but the COVID-19 lockdown pushed back our endline data collection for locations 2–4. In location 5, program implementation took one year instead of six months. Therefore, our endline survey in all but the first location occurs around two years after baseline. We control for variation in follow-up timing by including location fixed effects.

Baseline, midline, and endline surveys for women consist of five modules. The first covers household characteristics and socio-economic background. The second asks about household consumption decisions, including information on the overall contributions of household members to household income as well as expenditures in various consumption categories. The third measures business outcomes: established measures of sales and profits, business practices, investment decisions, and expectations about future business growth. We collect detailed data on psychometric indicators including locus of control, self-efficacy, grit, and various measures of aspirations for the future.[10] The last section contains the social network module.

We obtain detailed network data among the women in our sample using the photobooks produced at baseline in each location. Photobooks had 14–16 pages depending on the sample size in each location. Each of those pages displayed pictures of 16 women's faces without

[9] Figure A1 shows a complete timeline including all data collection, implementation of the program, and COVID-19 lockdowns.

[10] Appendix D contains detailed descriptions of the variables and indices we use in our empirical analysis. Appendix B details deviations from the pre-registered pre-analysis plan.

any further identifying information.[11] For each location, we produced distinct photobooks with randomly ordered photographs. We then asked women to look at each page and indicate which women they knew. Identifying a woman triggered a set of questions confirming the identity of the other woman and eliciting information about the type and intensity of interactions. We construct a woman's social network within our sample using these links. In addition to measuring key outcomes of interest, the network data allow us to test for spillovers to women in the control group because we can observe the number of treated women each woman in the control group is connected to at baseline. We use this variation in baseline connections as a continuous measure of exposure to treatment for women in the control group, but find no evidence of significant spillovers.[12]

Using photobooks allows us to collect detailed network data among the women in our sample at a relatively low cost: even with the module on social networks, our survey still fits within a two-hour window. Although the speed with which respondents can go through the photobooks alleviates concerns about respondent fatigue, the network module came near the end of the survey. Randomly ordering photos and using multiple photobooks with pictures placed in a different random order in each location allows us to correct for respondent fatigue.

We complement sales and profit data from our three in-person surveys with high-frequency data collected through SMS surveys. Starting the week after baseline surveys were completed, all women in our sample received a weekly text message on a randomly selected day asking them to report total sales revenue from the previous day. Those who did not have a business were told to reply with zero. We incentivized responses by offering participants UGS 1,000 (USD 0.30) in airtime. Each month, an enumerator supplemented the SMS surveys by calling each woman who had not responded to any SMS survey in the past month. We find that average daily revenues reported in SMS surveys during the months when baseline, midline,

[11] We ensured that all pages had 16 pictures (to effectively randomize) by filling the missing slots with enumerator pictures. All enumerators at baseline were women. We took those network nodes out of our dataset afterward to construct our network measures.

[12] See Appendix C for a detailed description of our spillovers analysis.

or endline surveys took place have a correlation of 0.31 with in-person reports, with 37% of reports being lower in the SMS survey than the in-person survey, 50% being higher in the SMS reports than the in-person reports, and 13% matching precisely. Given high variability in daily revenues, we view the SMS reports as credible; however, only around half of the women in our sample consistently responded to the SMS surveys. As such, it is difficult to draw comparisons between the SMS data and the in-person survey data.

At endline, we added a module to measure intrahousehold dynamics among women who were married or cohabitating with a partner. This module includes questions about household decision-making in different domains, attitudes toward IPV, and experiences of IPV. Given that SBS includes strong messaging about women's empowerment, we were concerned that questions in our intrahousehold module may be subject to strong experimenter demand effects. We therefore also collected a modified version of the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale (Crowne and Marlowe (1960)). This instrument is a set of questions developed by social psychologists to measure a respondent's propensity to give socially desirable answers, addressing possible experimenter demand effects. As mentioned in Dhar, Jain, and Jayachandran (2022), the questions account for certain too-good-to-be-true behaviors or traits that the respondent might consider to be desirable for the interviewer (e.g., always being courteous even to people who are disagreeable, always willing to admit their own mistakes). We present respondents with a 10-item version of the original 33-item module proposed (Reynolds (1982)), that has been validated in developing country settings in the past (Mukherjee (1967), Vu et al. (2011), Dhar, Jain, and Jayachandran (2022)). We label respondents with above-median social desirability scores as having high social desirability bias.

4 Empirical Strategy

Our design permits us to obtain intent to treat (ITT) effects of the program.[13] For an outcome of interest in a given survey round, O_{it}, we estimate the ANCOVA specification

$$O_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Home}_i + \beta_2 \text{Venue}_i + \delta_1 X_{i0} + \delta_2 O_{i0} + \epsilon_{it}. \quad (1)$$

β_1 gives the ITT effect of participating in the program with home visits, while β_2 gives the effect of participating in the program with venue-based coaching. We estimate ANCOVA treatment effects to improve precision, following D. McKenzie (2012). We control for a range of pre-specified baseline covariates: age, marital status, household size, the number of minors living in a household, participant education, and location strata fixed effects. O_{i0} is the outcome variable at baseline. We are interested in variation in treatment effects over time, so we estimate effects wave by wave rather than pooling data over both survey rounds. We compute White robust standard errors and Romano-Wolf q-values within pre-registered families of outcomes to adjust for multiple hypotheses testing.

Our primary hypothesis tests whether β_1 and β_2 are statistically significantly different from each other. We report p-values from a two-sided test of equality of the coefficients throughout.

To estimate intent to treat (ITT) effects on intrahousehold outcomes at endline that account for social desirability bias, we estimate

$$O_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Home}_i + \beta_2 \text{Venue}_i + \delta_1 \text{HSD}_i + \delta_2 \text{Home}_i \times \text{HSD}_i + \delta_3 \text{Venue}_i \times \text{HSD}_i + \boldsymbol{\gamma} \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_i. \quad (2)$$

Here, $\text{Home}_i = 1$ for women assigned to home visits, $\text{Venue}_i = 1$ for women assigned

[13] Our analysis was pre-registered and any deviations from the pre-analysis plan can be found in Appendix B.

to venue-based coaching, $\text{HSD}_i = 1$ for women with above-median social desirability scores, and $\mathbf{X}_i$ is a vector of baseline covariates. β_1 is the ITT effect of home visits for women with low social desirability bias, and β_2 is the effect of venue-based coaching for women with low social desirability bias. We estimate equation (2) on the sub-sample of women partnered at baseline. Because intrahousehold outcomes and the social desirability bias were measured at endline only, we cannot control for baseline values of these outcomes.[14]

To test for spillovers, we estimate treatment effects on women in the control group using their baseline social network connections. The spillover estimation and corresponding results can be found in Appendix C.

5 Results

5.1 Take-Up

Take-up of the program is high among both treatment groups. Recall that the program consists of two components: classroom modules in which coaches teach identical contents in a group setting, and individual coaching sessions for which the location where coaching is provided differs by treatment group. Only 6% of women assigned to either treatment group never attended any classroom training session. Table 1 shows that, on average, women in both treatment groups attended around five out of eight classroom modules. We observe no significant differences in classroom module attendance between the two treatment groups. We also observe no significant differences in the likelihood that women attended 7-8 modules between the two treatments, with just over one-third of women in both groups attending nearly every module.

[14]We only collected these outcomes at endline for two reasons. First, we were concerned that asking sensitive questions about IPV multiple times could increase attrition. Second, our original design for this module included spousal surveys, which we planned to do using separate field teams to maintain participant privacy.

Column 3 of Table 1 shows clear differences in the number of coaching sessions women attend depending on their treatment group. Women in both groups had the opportunity to have three coaching sessions in total. Women assigned to receive visits at their home or business attend 1.6 coaching sessions, on average, over the course of the program. Those assigned to venue-based coaching attend just 0.4 sessions on average: 55% never attend coaching, 43% attend one session, and only 4 of the 316 women attend more than one coaching session. These differences are unsurprising. Coaches reached out proactively to participants assigned to home visits for scheduling, whereas those assigned to venue-based coaching only received invitations and reminders about the coaching days at the training venue. In addition, women had to travel to the training venue to attend venue-based coaching. Thus, home visits are significantly better at ensuring compliance with the coaching component of the program.[15]

5.2 Results on Businesses

Despite higher compliance with coaching under home visits, effects from both treatments on business practices align closely immediately after the program ends. Figure 1 shows that our index of business practices increases by a statistically significant 0.32-0.33 standard deviations for both treatment groups at midline.[16] This is consistent with classroom module attendance being similar between the two treatment groups and the same material being taught in the classroom modules. This also suggests that classroom modules, rather than individualized coaching sessions, drive skill acquisition in this context. Our index of business performance is 0.12-0.17 standard deviations higher for both treatment groups relative to the control group at midline, though it is only significantly different from zero for women assigned to venue-based coaching. This index includes business ownership along with different measures of revenues and profits. Thus, while not transformative, the program appears to have been

[15] Table A4 shows predictors of attendance of classroom modules and coaching sessions by treatment group. In general, we observe few differences in the types of women attending classroom modules. Women who are employed and women with relatively more children attend significantly more coaching sessions when assigned to home visits rather than venue-based coaching.

[16] We provide results on each component of these indices in Table A5 and Table A6.

effective at teaching business skills and increasing the likelihood that women run profitable businesses.[17]

Effects for both treatment groups decline by endline, but the decline is more pronounced in the group assigned to home visits. Though not significantly different, effects on the business practices index are 0.11 standard deviations for women assigned to home visits compared to 0.16 standard deviations for those assigned to venue-based coaching. We see no persistent effects on business performance for women assigned to home visits relative to women assigned to the control group. By contrast, the positive effects of the program largely persist for women assigned to venue-based coaching: effects remain 0.14 standard deviations above the control group, though significant only at the 10% level.[18] The difference between the two groups at endline is significant at the 10% level.

It is surprising that home visits lead to significantly worse business outcomes than venue-based coaching at endline, effectively achieving no gains in business performance relative to the control group. Careful discussions with our implementing partner indicated no major differences in implementation between the two groups apart from the coaching modality. The material covered in class was identical for both treatments. Program coaches indicated that they were not covering systematically different material in home visits than they were during venue-based coaching meetings. We are therefore confident that these differences are not attributable to implementation failures in the home-visit group.

It is unlikely that these differences are driven by women assigned to home visits simply receiving *more* coaching. We would expect more coaching to result in weakly better business outcomes, whereas we observe the opposite. Additionally, if more coaching were harmful, we would expect to observe negative effects on business outcomes at midline as well as endline. Instead, we observe similar skill acquisition and business performance at program graduation.

[17] Table A23 shows heterogeneous effects by baseline business ownership on the business performance outcomes and index.

[18] See Table A5 for detailed results on the components of the business performance index and multiple inference corrections.

These patterns suggest that coaching modalities have differential impacts on factors that matter for longer-term business success despite having extremely similar short-term effects.

5.3 Non-business outcomes

To better understand what may have led to differences in the impacts of the two treatments, we turn to the remainder of our pre-specified outcomes. Figure 2 shows summary indices of our pre-specified families of outcomes that do not directly relate to women's businesses: network centrality, household consumption expenditures, psychometric indicators, and savings and investment. The top panel shows that, as with business performance, most of these outcomes show strikingly similar impacts between the two treatment groups at midline. In the bottom panel, we see that consumption and investment have not changed differentially between the two treatment groups at endline.[19]

Two features stand out at endline. First, women in the venue-based coaching group have significantly higher psychometric outcomes than those in the home visits group. Examining the individual outcomes that make up the psychometric index shows that grit is driving these differences.[20] This suggests that the more self-driven nature of venue-based coaching is more effective at developing persistence, which may partially explain why the venue-based modality leads to better business performance than home visits. Second, increases in network centrality persist much more strongly for women in the home visits group than they do for women in the venue-based coaching group. At endline, our index of network centrality for women assigned to home visits is more than twice that for women assigned to venue-based coaching, a difference that is significant at the 1% level.

Table 2 shows that women assigned to home visits see persistent, statistically significant increases across nearly all of our network outcomes. However, the most significant differences between the two treatment groups occur in our measure of a woman's centrality in the

[19] See Table A7 and Table A9 to see the individual components of the investment and consumption indices.
[20] See Table A8.

network as well as the centrality of the most central link in a woman's network. Intuitively, both measures indicate that women assigned to home visits end up having sustained links with more important women in their communities. It is logical that seeing coaches from outside the village visit a woman's business or home, may lead to more sustained increases in her network centrality than the alternative model where women seek out coaching at the training venue. However, the result on network centrality stands in stark contrast to other outcomes where venue-based coaching shows larger positive effects.

5.4 Mechanisms

Through what channels may higher network centrality hinder business performance? We first consider community-level impacts of high network centrality, then turn to household-level mechanisms.

Table 3 shows a set of four exploratory (not pre-registered) outcomes that speak to potentially negative effects of high network centrality from women's community and extended family networks. The first three columns show effects on the primary use of savings. Interestingly, women in both treatment groups show sustained reductions in the likelihood that they primarily use savings to help extended family members, but there are no significantly differential effects between the two groups at midline or endline. We find no significant effects on the likelihood of using savings for household expenses or for weddings and events for either group by endline, suggesting that women in the home-visit group are not responding to disproportionate requests for money. These null results suggests that community-level pressure may not operate through direct financial demands.

We also examine incidents of robbery, as higher network centrality may make women with home visits targets for theft if it is more widely known that they are trying to start a business. At midline, women in both treatment groups are significantly less likely to report being robbed than women in the control group. By endline, the effects only persist for

women in the venue-based coaching group, though the difference between the two treatment groups is not quite statistically significant. Though not definitive, this is consistent with women assigned to venue-based coaching finding ways to avoid becoming targets for theft more successfully than those assigned to home visits.

Although community-level mechanisms show limited evidence, home visits and the associated higher network centrality may also lead to different dynamics within households. Spouses are more likely to find out about women's participation in the program under the home-visit treatment, which may lead to higher spousal involvement in business decisions, less economic autonomy for women, or expropriation.

Recall that for all intrahousehold questions, we present two pre-registered specifications. The first mirrors the specifications used throughout the rest of the paper, except that we only asked intrahousehold questions at endline and therefore cannot control for baseline values. The second specification shows heterogeneity by above- versus below-median social desirability bias. Given that the program was run with only women and included repeated, strong messages of women's empowerment, we want to ensure that any observed effects on gender-related questions are not being driven by respondents prone to give socially desirable answers.

Table 4 shows effects on who makes decisions about the use of the woman's earnings, the man's earnings, whether a woman works, how savings are used, and whether the couple has a joint account.[21] After controlling for heterogeneity in social desirability bias, we find that women assigned to home visits are significantly less likely to have a say over how their earnings are used than women in the control group as well as qualitatively less likely (though not statistically significant) than women assigned to venue-based coaching.[22] They are sig-

[21] Note that these questions were only asked of women who had a partner and that they were not included in the endline survey in time for the first location, so the sample size is significantly reduced. For reference, Table A10, Table A11, Table A12, Table A13, Table A14, and Table A15 show effects on all pre-registered outcomes only among the women who were partnered at baseline.

[22] We observe few statistically significant interactions between social desirability bias and treatment status. Those that we do observe are negative, indicating that our effects should be biased toward zero.

nificantly less likely to have a say over how their spouse's earnings are used than women in venue-based coaching. We see no differences in the likelihood that women in either treatment group have a say over whether they work or how savings are used. Critically, women assigned to home visits are significantly more likely to have a joint account with their spouse than either women in the control group or women assigned to venue-based coaching, consistent with home visits reducing women's financial privacy.

The results in Table 4 show that the two coaching modalities have significantly different and persistent effects on intrahousehold dynamics. When coaching is delivered at a woman's home or business, it appears difficult for her to attain the degree of economic autonomy afforded to women who can participate in the program more privately, and in some cases even the degree of autonomy enjoyed by women in the control group.

We further explore the changes in household dynamics using data on a small subsample of couples from the original RCT (N=132) who we re-located 2 years after endline for a different study.[23] We interviewed each member of the couple separately and asked them to report their own and their spouse's monthly earnings. Table 5 shows the difference between a husband's report and his wife's report of her monthly earnings. We observe that even with the small sample size and more than 3 years after the program ended, spouses have significantly more accurate information about women's earnings in the home-visit group than they do in the venue-based coaching group. This is again consistent with home visits leading to persistent increases in spousal knowledge of women's businesses relative to what we see for venue-based coaching. It suggests that home visits fundamentally alter household information environments rather than being a temporary shock.

Higher spousal knowledge of women's businesses and earnings may negatively impact business performance through multiple channels. Spouses may engage in more expropriation, making it more difficult for women to grow their businesses. Alternatively, spousal

[23]We did not originally plan to relocate study participants after 2 years had elapsed. We therefore could only relocate around one-third of partnered women from the original sample.

involvement could simply make it more difficult for women to apply the skills taught in the program. If higher spousal knowledge led to forceful expropriation, we would expect increases in intimate partner violence.

Table 6 shows results on a binary measure of IPV as well as an index combining answers to individual questions on different types of abuse. For both, we show effects on women experiencing abuse in the 12 months before the endline survey after accounting for heterogeneity in social desirability bias.

Women in the home-visit group are significantly less likely to have experienced abuse in the 12 months before the endline survey than either women in the venue-based coaching group or women in the control group. The effects are large: a 40% reduction in the likelihood of experiencing abuse in the year before endline, accounting for heterogeneity in social desirability, or a 21% reduction without accounting for heterogeneity. In line with these results, we also see that women assigned to home visits have significantly lower abuse index values than those in the control group. Values on the abuse index are qualitatively lower for women assigned to home visits relative to venue-based coaching, but not statistically significantly different.

The results in Table 6 are not consistent with home visits leading to more violent expropriation than venue-based coaching. Instead, we observe that home visits are highly effective at reducing IPV.[24] Interestingly, the reduction in IPV does not appear to be the result of higher reporting: columns (9)-(12) show that women in both treatment groups are not significantly more likely to report IPV (if anything, they are less likely to tell anyone about it or report it to the authorities). We also see no evidence of differential divorce between the two treatment groups, ruling out mechanical changes in IPV from changes in partnership status, as well as no differential change in attitudes towards IPV (see Table A22 and Table A21). Instead, the reduction in IPV paired with the reduction in women's household decision-making

[24] Table A20 shows effects on the specific types of abuse that make up our aggregate measures. We see that reductions in abuse are concentrated in physical violence.

power appears to be consistent with couples arriving at a different equilibrium due to differences in the coaching modalities used. Home visits increase spousal knowledge about the woman's business but also increase the woman's network centrality. One interpretation consistent with these results is that home visits deter expropriation because women's increased network centrality makes abusive behavior more socially costly. However, home visits alter the information environment in ways that lead to couples running the business more collectively, which prevents the woman from applying the skills learned as effectively as she would be able to do without spousal involvement. For instance, women may face barriers to re-investment or have less flexibility to experiment with new business practices. By contrast, women assigned to venue-based coaching choose to keep their participation private, leaving intrahousehold dynamics unchanged.

6 Conclusion

We experimentally vary coaching modalities in an entrepreneurship training program for women in Uganda. Holding program content constant, we find that businesses of women in venue-based coaching outperform the businesses of those with home visits despite having acquired identical skills at program graduation. We argue that home visits affect the visibility of program participation at both the community and household level. Home visits persistently increase a woman's network centrality, which is associated with a suggestive increase in robberies relative to venue-based coaching but also contributes to reductions in intimate partner violence. Home visits increase spousal knowledge about women's income, which erodes women's economic autonomy.

Our results highlight a meaningful trade-off for program designers and policy-makers. Although home visits achieve higher compliance and reduce intimate partner violence, they produce worse economic outcomes and undermine women's economic autonomy. After completing the RCT, our implementing partner began giving women in new cohorts a choice

between home visits and venue-based coaching. They reported that roughly 70% of women in these cohorts opted for venue-based coaching, even without being told about the results of the RCT. This speaks to the value that women place on economic autonomy and privacy, although it is unclear whether women anticipate potential reductions in IPV when making this decision. Women's choices suggest that they are aware of the potential economic losses from home visits.

The mechanism we identify, the visibility of program participation, triggers the same effects that existing literature has documented for increases in cash in both developed and developing countries (Carranza et al. (2025)). Our results raise the possibility that even interventions that merely make women's ambitions for economic advancement visible to households or their broader community could face similar headwinds, irrespective of whether women have actually realized economic gains.

Our analysis is limited to a sample of self-selected women in five communities in central Uganda. Rates of intimate partner violence, norms around household bargaining, information sharing, female labor force participation, and community network structures may differ in other contexts and among women who would not self-select into the type of training we study. Our analysis of household dynamics relies on the subsample of women partnered at baseline, which limits statistical power to detect smaller but potentially important effect sizes for some mechanisms. The conditions under which the visibility of program participation is a binding constraint, and the magnitudes of trade-offs they create, remain open questions.

Our results prompt several directions for future research. First, our current design does not allow us to identify which underlying features translate visibility into economic pressure. The network mechanisms may operate differently in contexts with weaker community ties, norms, or underlying beliefs. Second, can we design programs that preserve privacy while simultaneously maintaining the benefits of home visits such as compliance? If the documented benefits of home visits are real, then understanding whether programs can achieve both matters for policy. Lastly, our results raise deeper questions about how to evaluate programs

when effects on violence and economic outcomes point in opposite directions.

Figures



Notes: Average treatment effects on summary indices for each family of pre-registered business outcomes, estimated separately at midline and endline. Blue circles represent estimated effects for home visits. Red triangles are estimates effects for venue-based coaching. Coefficients are ANCOVA estimates that control for the outcome at baseline, the respondent's location, marital status, household size, number of children, age, network size, and level of education, all at baseline. Bars show 95% confidence intervals calculated using White robust standard errors. Stars next to index labels on the vertical axis denote p-values of the hypothesis test of equality between the two treatment groups: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Figure 1: Average Treatment Effects on Summary Indices: Business Outcomes



Notes: Average treatment effects on summary indices for each family of non-business pre-registered outcomes, estimated separately at midline and endline. Blue circles represent estimated effects for home visits. Red triangles are estimates effects for venue-based coaching. Coefficients are ANCOVA estimates that control for the outcome at baseline, the respondent's location, marital status, household size, number of children, age, network size, and level of education, all at baseline. Bars show 95% confidence intervals calculated using White robust standard errors. Stars next to index labels on the vertical axis denote p-values of the hypothesis test of equality between the two treatment groups: $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$.

Figure 2: Average Treatment Effects on Summary Indices: Non-Business Outcomes

Tables

Table 1: Take-Up

	(1) Module Attendance	(2) Attend 7-8 Modules	(3) Coaching Sessions
Home Visit	4.831***	0.356***	1.623***
	(0.161)	(0.030)	(0.071)
Venue-Based	4.923***	0.365***	0.411***
	(0.177)	(0.032)	(0.041)
Home = Venue	0.667	0.833	0.000
Adj. R^2	0.555	0.176	0.446
Observations	806	806	847

Notes: Coefficients are OLS estimates that control for the respondent's baseline location, marital status, household size, number of children, age, network size, and education. Module Attendance is a continuous variable measuring the total number of classroom modules attended by the participant, ranging from 0 to 8. Attend 7-8 Modules is a binary indicator equal to one if the participant attended at least seven of the eight classroom modules. Coaching Sessions is a continuous variable measuring the total number of one-on-one coaching sessions completed by the participant with an NGO coach, ranging from 0 to 3. We report White robust standard errors in parentheses. Home = Venue reports the p-value from a two-sided test of equality of the coefficients on Home Visit and Venue-Based coaching. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, ***, $p < 0.01$.

Table 2: Treatment Effects on Network Centrality Outcomes

	(1) In-Degree	(2) Out-Degree	(3) Centrality of Most Central Link	(4) Eigenvector Centrality	(5) Index
			Panel A: Midline (6 months)		
Home Visit	1.201***	0.741***	0.011***	0.007***	0.294***
	(0.282)	(0.260)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.057)
Venue-Based	1.348***	0.755***	0.006*	0.008***	0.277***
	(0.281)	(0.270)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.057)
Control Mean	4.755	5.588	0.117	0.052	-0.145
RW q-value Home	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010
RW q-value Venue	0.010	0.010	0.109	0.010	0.010
Home = Venue	0.619	0.963	0.210	0.559	0.774
Adj. R^2	0.657	0.236	0.278	0.552	0.525
Observations	847	847	847	847	847
			Panel B: Endline(12–18 months)		
Home Visit	0.948***	0.559*	0.016***	0.006***	0.303***
	(0.271)	(0.332)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.070)
Venue-Based	0.699***	0.383	-0.001	0.003*	0.117
	(0.270)	(0.370)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.073)
Control Mean	5.225	6.081	0.116	0.054	-0.049
RW q-value Home	0.020	0.129	0.020	0.010	0.010
RW q-value Venue	0.059	0.515	0.772	0.208	0.257
Home = Venue	0.361	0.611	0.000	0.049	0.009
Adj. R^2	0.720	0.147	0.240	0.507	0.434
Observations	851	851	851	851	851

Notes: Coefficients are ANCOVA estimates that control for the outcome at baseline, the respondent's location, marital status, household size, number of children, age, network size, and level of education. In-Degree and Out-Degree measure the number of incoming and outgoing ties, respectively, in the directed social network. Centrality of Most Central Link measures the highest eigenvector centrality among alters in the respondent's network. Eigenvector Centrality measures the extent to which the respondent is connected to alters who themselves are well connected within the network. Index is an M. L. Anderson (2008) index that aggregates In-Degree, Out-Degree, and Centrality of Most Central Link, and excludes the respondent's own eigenvector centrality, using the swindex command in Stata. We report White robust standard errors in parentheses and Romano-Wolf correct q-values at the bottom of each panel. Home = Venue reports the p-value from a two-sided test of equality of the coefficients on Home Visit and Venue-Based coaching. Note that we did not pre-specify a woman's own eigenvector centrality; however, including it in our multiple-inference corrections does not alter which pre-registered outcomes achieve each significance level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 3: Treatment Effects on Savings Use and Security

	Primary Savings Use			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Help Family	HH Expenses	Weddings & Events	Robbed (Last 6 Months)
	Panel A: Midline (6 months)			
Home Visit	-0.084**	-0.029	-0.069*	-0.126***
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.042)
Venue-Based	-0.085**	-0.058	-0.052	-0.109***
	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.042)
Control Mean	0.412	0.615	0.327	0.510
Home = Venue	0.991	0.474	0.625	0.680
Adj. R^2	0.065	0.049	0.085	0.113
Observations	847	847	847	847
	Panel B: Endline (18–24 Months)			
Home Visit	-0.077*	0.017	-0.032	-0.012
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.042)
Venue-Based	-0.071*	-0.053	-0.038	-0.075*
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.041)
Control Mean	0.407	0.589	0.314	0.422
Home = Venue	0.865	0.085	0.867	0.115
Adj. R^2	0.051	0.075	0.097	0.044
Observations	851	851	851	851

Notes: Coefficients are ANCOVA estimates that control for the outcome at baseline, the respondent's location, marital status, household size, number of children, age, network size, and level of education. Help Family, Household Expenses, and Weddings & Events are binary indicators equal to one if the respondent reports having used savings to help family or friends, to pay for household expenses, or to finance weddings, funerals, or other social events, respectively. Robbed (Last 6 Months) is a binary indicator equal to one if the respondent reports having been robbed in the six months prior to the survey. We report White robust standard errors in parentheses. Home = Venue reports the p-value from a two-sided test of equality of the coefficients on Home Visit and Venue-Based coaching. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: Treatment Effects on Household Decision-Making Outcomes for Partnered Women

	Earnings Control				Financial Control					
	Participant's		Spouse's		Women Working		Joint Account		Use of Savings	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Home Visit	-0.033	-0.054**	-0.031	-0.117	-0.013	0.016	0.065*	0.080*	-0.059	-0.119
	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.065)	(0.074)	(0.057)	(0.075)	(0.035)	(0.046)	(0.064)	(0.081)
Venue-Based	-0.016	-0.017	-0.052	0.037	-0.050	-0.013	-0.010	0.002	-0.055	-0.046
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.065)	(0.076)	(0.060)	(0.076)	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.061)	(0.078)
HSD		-0.040		0.152		0.190**		0.021		0.026
		(0.038)		(0.114)		(0.082)		(0.056)		(0.098)
Home x HSD		0.060		0.198		-0.107		-0.041		0.146
		(0.045)		(0.136)		(0.106)		(0.075)		(0.123)
Venue x HSD		0.004		-0.274*		-0.129		-0.036		-0.034
		(0.041)		(0.140)		(0.111)		(0.073)		(0.131)
Control Mean	0.992	0.992	0.333	0.333	0.784	0.784	0.056	0.056	0.664	0.664
Home = Venue	0.463	0.231	0.736	0.031	0.484	0.674	0.044	0.096	0.941	0.338
HomexHSD=VenuexHSD		0.229		0.000		0.838		0.947		0.139
Home+HSD+HomexHSD=0		0.290		0.008		0.207		0.218		0.550
Venue+HSD+VenuexHSD=0		0.087		0.343		0.579		0.781		0.549
Adj. R^2	-0.045	-0.046	-0.026	0.030	-0.024	-0.015	-0.024	-0.031	0.039	0.042
Observations	440	440	430	430	445	445	438	438	445	445

Notes: Coefficients are OLS estimates that control for the respondent's location, household size, number of minors in the household, and age of the respondent at baseline. Women's earnings and men's earnings are binary variables equal to one if the woman reports that she or she and her partner jointly decide how the money will be used. Women working is a binary variable equal to one if the woman reports that she or she and her partner jointly make decisions about whether she will work. Joint account is a binary variable if the respondent reports she has any joint accounts with her husband. Use of savings is a binary variable equal to one if the woman reports whether she or she and her partner jointly make decisions about making major household purchases. We report White robust standard errors in parentheses. Home = Venue reports the p-value from a two-sided test of equality of the coefficients on Home Visit and Venue-Based coaching. HomexHSD=VenuexHSD is the p-value for the null hypothesis that the estimates for Home VisitxHSD and VenuexHSD are equal. Home+HSD+HomexHSD=0 corresponds to the p-value for the null hypothesis that Home Visits + HSD + HomexHSD = 0. Venue+HSD+VenuexHSD=0 corresponds to the p-value for the null hypothesis that Venue-Based + HSD + VanuexHSD = 0. We omit Romano-Wolf q-values for brevity as none of these outcomes survive multiple inference corrections, but list them in Table A16 and Table A17. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, ***, $p < 0.01$.

Table 5: Exploratory Treatment Effects on Spousal Knowledge of Income

	(1) Difference in Spouse and Woman's Estimate of Woman's Monthly Earnings
Home Visit	-28924.511
	(99109.172)
Vanue-Based	261281.295**
	(121134.670)
Control Mean	49548.956
Home = Venue	0
Adj. R^2	0.087
Observations	132

Notes: Coefficients are OLS estimates that control for the respondent's location and baseline measures of the woman's business and financial performance: business assets, savings, revenues, and self-reported profits. We report White robust standard errors in parentheses. Home = Venue reports the p-value from a two-sided test of equality of the coefficients on Home Visit and Venue-Based coaching. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, ***, $p < 0.01$.

Table 6: Treatment Effects on Intimate Partner Violence

	Has Been Abused				Abuse Index							
	Ever		Last 12 months		Ever		Last 12 months		Told Anyone		Sought Authorities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Home Visit	-0.038	-0.096	-0.083	-0.161*	-0.427	-0.828*	-0.316	-0.741*	-0.073	-0.044	-0.073	0.002
	(0.073)	(0.087)	(0.071)	(0.087)	(0.355)	(0.447)	(0.302)	(0.388)	(0.104)	(0.127)	(0.073)	(0.087)
Venue-Based	0.032	0.057	0.042	0.020	0.019	0.015	-0.030	-0.210	-0.088	-0.012	-0.058	-0.052
	(0.077)	(0.089)	(0.077)	(0.093)	(0.390)	(0.486)	(0.339)	(0.430)	(0.101)	(0.111)	(0.071)	(0.079)
HSD		-0.159		-0.207*		-0.723		-1.009**		0.289		0.041
		(0.125)		(0.118)		(0.554)		(0.436)		(0.180)		(0.121)
Home x HSD		0.172		0.236		1.167		1.275**		-0.211		-0.236*
		(0.154)		(0.146)		(0.709)		(0.574)		(0.229)		(0.138)
Venue x HSD		-0.080		0.073		0.021		0.593		-0.389		-0.065
		(0.159)		(0.154)		(0.781)		(0.661)		(0.242)		(0.150)
Control Mean	0.590	0.590	0.400	0.400	1.790	1.790	1.124	1.124	0.574	0.574	0.129	0.129
Home = Venue	0.301	0.064	0.065	0.030	0.219	0.056	0.366	0.183	0.869	0.784	0.808	0.504
HomexHSD=VenuexHSD		0.070		0.230		0.117		0.281		0.410		0.150
Home+HSD+HomexHSD=0		0.413		0.184		0.468		0.282		0.803		0.024
Venue+HSD+VenuexHSD=0		0.092		0.284		0.239		0.208		0.515		0.483
Adj. R^2	-0.025	-0.011	-0.017	-0.011	-0.014	-0.011	0.010	0.016	-0.025	-0.025	-0.008	0.001
Observations	393	393	393	393	393	393	393	393	228	228	229	229

Notes: Coefficients are OLS estimates that control for the respondent's location, household size, the number of children, and the respondent's age at baseline. Has been abused - Ever is a binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers yes to any questions of the Abused Index, while abused - last 12 months is equal to one if the respondent answers yes to any questions of the Abused Index in the last 12 months. Abuse Index - Ever combines multiple questions about attitudes or actions the current partner may have done to the wife with a maximum value of 13, while Abuse Index - Last 12 months combine the same questions if it happened in the past 12 months. Told Anyone is a binary indicator equal to one if the respondent reports having disclosed the abuse to anyone. Sought Authorities is a binary indicator equal to one if the respondent reports having sought help from authorities. We report White robust standard errors in parentheses. Home = Venue reports the p-value from a two-sided test of equality of the coefficients on Home Visit and Venue-Based coaching. HomexHSD=VenuexHSD corresponds to the p-value for the null hypothesis that the estimates for HomexHSD and VenuexHSD are equal. Home+HSD+HomexHSD=0 corresponds to the p-value for the null hypothesis that Home Visit + HSD + HomexHSD = 0. Venue+HSD+VenuexHSD=0 corresponds to the p-value for the null hypothesis that Venue-Based + HSD + VenuexHSD = 0. We omit Romao-Wolf q-values for brevity as none of these outcomes survive multiple inference corrections, but list them in Table A18 and Table A19. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, ***, $p < 0.01$.

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A Supplemental tables and figures

Table A1: Entrepreneurship Program Content

	Training Modules	**Coaching**
Month 0	Mobilization Orientation	–
Month 1	"Getting out of your comfort zone" Identifying business opportunities Finding capital and starting small	First session
Month 2	Bookkeeping and record keeping Market research	–
Month 3	Business planning	Second session
Month 4	Growing the customer base Money management	–
Month 5	No modules (implementation of business plans)	–
Month 6	Graduation ceremony	Third session



Figure A1: Study Timeline

Table A2: Balance

Variable	(1) Control N	(1) Control Mean/(SD)	(2) Home Visit N	(2) Home Visit Mean/(SD)	(3) Venue-Based N	(3) Venue-Based Mean/(SD)	F-test for balance across all groups N	F-test for balance across all groups F-stat/P-value
Age	285	37.884	339	37.487	316	38.028	940	0.170
		(12.916)		(12.269)		(11.863)		0.844
Primary Ed.	285	0.488	339	0.522	316	0.560	940	1.581
		(0.501)		(0.500)		(0.497)		0.206
Secondary Ed.	285	0.902	339	0.950	316	0.930	940	2.722*
		(0.298)		(0.219)		(0.255)		0.066
Father Primary Ed.	285	0.765	339	0.785	316	0.810	940	0.924
		(0.425)		(0.412)		(0.393)		0.397
Father Secondary Ed.	285	0.933	339	0.926	316	0.937	940	0.147
		(0.250)		(0.262)		(0.244)		0.863
Mother Primary Ed.	285	0.828	339	0.885	316	0.864	940	2.113
		(0.378)		(0.320)		(0.343)		0.121
Mother Secondary Ed.	285	0.954	339	0.973	316	0.975	940	1.246
		(0.209)		(0.161)		(0.157)		0.288
Employed	285	0.537	339	0.496	316	0.541	940	0.827
		(0.500)		(0.501)		(0.499)		0.437
HH Size	285	4.225	339	4.230	316	4.408	940	0.507
		(2.488)		(2.620)		(2.675)		0.603
Minors	285	2.926	339	2.991	316	3.174	940	1.136
		(2.101)		(2.099)		(2.132)		0.321
Own a Business	285	0.551	339	0.490	316	0.522	940	1.169
		(0.498)		(0.501)		(0.500)		0.311
Network Size	285	4.544	339	4.864	316	4.905	940	0.964
		(3.546)		(3.269)		(3.612)		0.382
Social Desirability Score	208	6.856	252	6.889	249	6.783	709	0.303
		(1.503)		(1.508)		(1.627)		0.738
Married	285	0.618	339	0.622	316	0.677	940	1.487
		(0.487)		(0.485)		(0.468)		0.227

Notes: Mean baseline covariates by treatment group. Standard deviations are in parentheses. For paternal and maternal education attainment, we impute the sample median to preserve the number of observations when a value is missing. The last column reports p-values associated with F-tests of joint equality between the three groups. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, ***, $p < 0.01$.

Table A3: Attrition

	At Midline		At Endline	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Home Visit	0.017	0.020	0.003	0.009
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Venue-Based	-0.016	-0.013	-0.003	0.004
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Age		-0.001		-0.004***
		(0.001)		(0.001)
Primary Ed.		-0.001		0.034*
		(0.020)		(0.020)
Secondary Ed.		-0.084*		-0.138***
		(0.049)		(0.050)
Father Primary Ed.		-0.005		-0.010
		(0.031)		(0.031)
Father Secondary Ed.		0.056		0.031
		(0.042)		(0.044)
Mother Primary Ed.		0.011		-0.003
		(0.032)		(0.033)
Mother Secondary Ed.		-0.024		-0.060
		(0.066)		(0.072)
Employed		0.057**		0.033
		(0.026)		(0.023)
HH Size		0.008		0.008
		(0.010)		(0.008)
Minors		-0.017		-0.015*
		(0.011)		(0.009)
Married		0.027		-0.022
		(0.022)		(0.023)
Own a Business		-0.077***		-0.029
		(0.025)		(0.022)
Network Size		-0.003		-0.001
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Adj. R^2	-0.000	0.019	-0.002	0.033
Observations	940	940	940	940

Notes: The table reports attrition rates at midline and endline, differentiating by treatment arm. For paternal and maternal education attainment, we impute the sample median to preserve the number of observations when a value is missing. We report White standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, ***, $p < 0.01$.

Table A4: Predictors of Attendance

	Module Attendance		Coaching Attendance	
	(1) Home	(2) Venue	(3) Home	(4) Venue
Age	0.029**	0.023	0.006	0.001
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.003)
Primary Ed.	-0.080	-0.123	-0.192	-0.021
	(0.311)	(0.335)	(0.142)	(0.068)
Secondary Ed.	-0.490	0.040	0.393	0.084
	(0.732)	(0.736)	(0.409)	(0.128)
Father Primary Ed.	-0.309	-0.476	0.008	-0.072
	(0.468)	(0.492)	(0.222)	(0.095)
Father Secondary Ed.	-0.469	-0.016	-0.161	0.164
	(0.537)	(0.726)	(0.308)	(0.155)
Mother Primary Ed.	0.017	0.182	0.169	-0.075
	(0.587)	(0.536)	(0.255)	(0.112)
Mother Secondary Ed.	-0.658	0.251	0.090	0.004
	(0.931)	(1.183)	(0.527)	(0.236)
Employed	-0.064	-1.018**	0.387**	-0.020
	(0.356)	(0.409)	(0.164)	(0.082)
HH Size	0.212	0.072	-0.073	0.000
	(0.136)	(0.115)	(0.063)	(0.028)
Minors	-0.162	0.035	0.156**	0.011
	(0.176)	(0.144)	(0.076)	(0.034)
Own a Business	0.095	0.438	-0.194	-0.069
	(0.342)	(0.409)	(0.160)	(0.081)
Network Size	0.075*	0.005	0.013	-0.013
	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.020)	(0.008)
Married	-0.514	-0.260	0.138	-0.011
	(0.339)	(0.373)	(0.157)	(0.075)
Constant	5.253***	4.384***	0.684	0.400
	(1.217)	(1.368)	(0.716)	(0.276)
Adj. R^2	0.040	0.001	0.013	-0.023
Observations	289	260	300	290

Notes: All variables are baseline values. We report White robust standard errors in parentheses. For paternal and maternal education attainment, we impute the sample median to preserve the number of observations when a value is missing. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, ***, $p < 0.01$.

Table A5: Treatment Effects on Business Outcomes

	(1) Own a Business	(2) Revenue	(3) Revenue (SMS)	(4) Calculated Profits	(5) Profits	(6) Index
			Panel A: Midline (6 months)			
Home Visit	0.146***	4073.910	-1609.695	-499.365	15265.281	0.125
	(0.038)	(6222.533)	(1994.756)	(6094.768)	(13128.813)	(0.082)
Venue-Based	0.162***	3618.580	-613.958	-1552.954	22253.961*	0.167**
	(0.038)	(6290.755)	(2007.480)	(6002.731)	(12802.900)	(0.082)
Control Mean	0.566	37674.603	13738.804	3742.825	87551.362	-0.032
RW q-val Home	0.010	0.743	0.743	0.950	0.604	0.406
RW q-val Venue	0.010	0.941	0.950	0.950	0.307	0.188
Home = Venue	0.647	0.936	0.556	0.839	0.596	0.581
Adj. R^2	0.224	0.190	0.309	-0.002	0.180	0.156
Observations	846	824	444	824	847	847
			Panel B: Endline (18–24 Months)			
Home Visit	0.025	-5215.263	130.505	3233.737	-3144.544	-0.003
	(0.039)	(6244.409)	(2878.129)	(5918.309)	(12344.780)	(0.082)
Venue-Based	0.068*	9744.006	-152.283	10234.491*	11836.173	0.141*
	(0.038)	(6807.012)	(2472.831)	(5898.562)	(12697.274)	(0.084)
Control Mean	0.667	43628.016	13661.314	3776.265	95054.651	0.077
RW q-val Home	0.941	0.941	1.000	0.980	0.990	1.000
RW q-val Venue	0.366	0.366	0.941	0.366	0.594	0.366
Home = Venue	0.244	0.011	0.907	0.192	0.211	0.071
Adj. R^2	0.103	0.167	0.144	0.004	0.145	0.091
Observations	851	835	409	835	851	851

Notes: We winsorize all sales and profit measures at the 99th percentile. Coefficients are ANCOVA estimates that control for the outcome at baseline, the respondent's location, marital status, household size, number of children, age, network size and level of education. Revenue presents the reported sales for the 3 days prior to the survey. Revenue (SMS) is the average revenue the day before the SMS survey was received during the relevant period. Calculated Profits are revenues less costs for transport, products, employees, and other operational costs in the three days before the survey. Profits are self-reported profits from the month before using the question from de Mel, D. J. McKenzie, and Woodruff (2009). Business Index is an M. L. Anderson (2008) index of all outcomes using the swindex command in Stata. We report White robust standard errors in parentheses. *RW q-val* are Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis test q-values. Q-values include the same controls as above and are computed within pre-registered families of outcomes. Home = Venue reports the p-value from a two-sided test of equality of the coefficients on Home Visit and Venue-Based coaching. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A6: Treatment Effects on Business Practices

	(1) Tracking	(2) Price Management	(3) Goat Setting	(4) Work Hours	(5) Index
		Panel A: Midline (6 months)			
Home Visit	0.278**	0.375**	0.327**	10.981***	0.353***
	(0.133)	(0.153)	(0.129)	(4.222)	(0.101)
Venue-Based	0.321**	0.469***	0.223*	10.992**	0.326***
	(0.137)	(0.155)	(0.132)	(4.290)	(0.105)
Control Mean	0.957	1.012	0.643	27.909	-0.123
RW q-val Home	0.040	0.030	0.030	0.030	0.010
RW q-val Venue	0.040	0.010	0.069	0.040	0.010
Home = Venue	0.742	0.526	0.417	0.998	0.781
Adj. R^2	0.157	0.106	0.108	0.180	0.183
Observations	447	435	374	359	451
		Panel B: Endline (18–24 Months)			
Home Visit	0.047	0.106	0.256**	4.295	0.112
	(0.135)	(0.158)	(0.128)	(4.390)	(0.102)
Venue-Based	0.142	0.274*	0.190	4.475	0.160
	(0.137)	(0.166)	(0.135)	(4.266)	(0.104)
Control Mean	1.133	1.239	0.688	34.850	0.054
RW q-val Home	0.782	0.762	0.158	0.634	0.604
RW q-val Venue	0.515	0.347	0.436	0.515	0.356
Home = Venue	0.477	0.273	0.617	0.966	0.634
Adj. R^2	0.069	0.032	0.074	0.110	0.102
Observations	443	427	366	365	447

Notes: Coefficients are ANCOVA estimates that control for the outcome at baseline, the respondent's location, marital status, household size, number of children, age, network size and level of education. Tracking combines multiple questions about record keeping for the business with a maximum value of 3. Price management combines multiple questions about setting prices, running promotions, comparing prices with competitors, and negotiating for better prices with suppliers with a maximum value of 4. Goal setting combines multiple questions about setting goals for the business over various time horizons with a maximum value of 3. Work hours is the number of hours the respondent typically works in her main business. Index is an M. L. Anderson (2008) index of all outcomes using the swindex command in Stata. We report White robust standard errors in parentheses. *RW q-val* are Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis test q-values. Q-values include the same controls as above and are computed within pre-registered families of outcomes. Home = Venue reports the p-value from a two-sided test of equality of the coefficients on Home Visit and Venue-Based coaching. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A7: Treatment Effects on Savings and Investment

	(1) Savings	(2) Invested in Business (Binary)	(3) Index
Panel A: Midline (6 months)			
Home Visit	29224.172	0.145***	0.254***
	(25415.780)	(0.038)	(0.074)
Venue-Based	-10486.645	0.152***	0.213***
	(22379.408)	(0.038)	(0.073)
Control Mean	169641.434	0.549	-0.066
RW q-val Home	0.248	0.010	0.010
RW q-val Venue	0.673	0.010	0.020
Home = Venue	0.105	0.846	0.580
Adj. R^2	0.221	0.200	0.241
Observations	816	846	847
Panel B: Endline (18–24 Months)			
Home Visit	11375.538	0.024	0.077
	(25219.770)	(0.039)	(0.077)
Venue-Based	20838.833	0.069*	0.158*
	(26340.338)	(0.039)	(0.081)
Control Mean	165480.937	0.659	0.076
RW q-val Home	0.812	0.812	0.614
RW q-val Venue	0.416	0.198	0.149
Home = Venue	0.715	0.226	0.314
Adj. R^2	0.223	0.091	0.175
Observations	825	850	851

Notes: We winsorize our savings measures at the 99th percentile. Coefficients are ANCOVA estimates that control for the outcome at baseline, the respondent's location, marital status, household size, number of children, age, network size and level of education. Savings measures the total amount held across all financial savings instruments. Business Investment is a binary indicator equal to one if the respondent reports having made any investment in her business in the last six months. Index is an M. L. Anderson (2008) index of all outcomes using the swindex command in Stata. We report White robust standard errors in parentheses. *RW q-val* are Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis test q-values. Q-values include the same controls as above and are computed within pre-registered families of outcomes. Home = Venue reports the p-value from a two-sided test of equality of the coefficients on Home Visit and Venue-Based coaching. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A8: Treatment Effects on Psychometric Outcomes

	Locus of Control					Aspirations			
	(1) Internal	(2) Chance	(3) PO	(4) Self Eff.	(5) Grit	(6) Income	(7) Social Status	(8) Education	(9) Index
Panel A: Midline (6 months)									
Home Visit	0.226	0.387	-0.006	-0.031	0.193	-320192.460	-0.065	0.070	0.053
	(0.202)	(0.342)	(0.403)	(0.552)	(0.493)	(203599.655)	(0.087)	(0.098)	(0.078)
Venue-Based	-0.018	0.311	0.056	0.428	0.896*	-14080.049	0.123	-0.030	0.109
	(0.213)	(0.336)	(0.399)	(0.564)	(0.480)	(222331.003)	(0.086)	(0.101)	(0.078)
Control Mean	15.836	-14.645	-12.914	38.605	29.488	1481218.341	3.079	4.234	-0.032
RW q-val Home	0.842	0.842	1.000	1.000	0.980	0.663	0.960	0.960	0.960
RW q-val Venue	1.000	0.871	1.000	0.911	0.376	1.000	0.683	1.000	0.683
Home = Venue	0.237	0.806	0.871	0.391	0.112	0.153	0.026	0.304	0.439
Adj. R^2	0.026	0.079	0.134	0.115	0.094	0.112	0.092	0.106	0.107
Observations	842	843	842	842	843	670	832	739	845
Panel B: Endline (18–24 Months)									
Home Visit	0.013	-0.282	0.192	-0.151	-0.510	-428592.787**	-0.015	-0.144	-0.103
	(0.242)	(0.345)	(0.428)	(0.580)	(0.469)	(188840.387)	(0.093)	(0.114)	(0.082)
Venue-Based	0.347	-0.257	0.302	0.445	0.882*	-360414.604*	0.038	0.004	0.069
	(0.242)	(0.347)	(0.434)	(0.583)	(0.476)	(193764.458)	(0.089)	(0.112)	(0.085)
Control Mean	15.801	-14.191	-12.121	39.289	30.094	1577941.909	2.992	4.066	-0.014
RW q-val Home	0.990	0.941	0.980	0.990	0.861	0.139	0.990	0.851	0.851
RW q-val Venue	0.574	0.921	0.921	0.921	0.347	0.347	0.921	0.950	0.921
Home = Venue	0.137	0.940	0.782	0.278	0.002	0.669	0.523	0.176	0.032
Adj. R^2	0.038	0.042	0.043	0.126	0.107	0.070	0.028	0.097	0.114
Observations	843	844	843	843	844	689	830	714	848

Notes: Coefficients are ANCOVA estimates that control for the outcome at baseline, the respondent's location, marital status, household size, number of children, age, network size and level of education. We draw our locus of control measures from Levenson (1973). Internal, PO, and Chance is the dimension of the locus of control score. Positive values for Internal, PO and Chance provide evidence of improvements in locus of control measures independent of type. Our measures of grit follow Angela L. Duckworth et al. (2007) and Angela Lee Duckworth and Quinn (2009). We measure generalized self-efficacy following Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995). Income and Social Status measure the gap between the respondent's current level and the level she aspires to attain in ten years in each respective domain. Education Aspirations measures what is the respondent education aspiration for her children. We winsorize the income aspirations variable at the 99th percentile. Index is an M. L. Anderson (2008) index of all outcomes using the swindex command in Stata. We report White robust standard errors in parentheses. *RW q-val* are Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis test q-values. Q-values include the same controls as above and are computed within pre-registered families of outcomes. Home = Venue reports the p-value from a two-sided test of equality of the coefficients on Home Visit and Venue-Based coaching. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A9: Treatment Effects on Consumption

	Participant's			Spouses			Other HH Members					
	(1) Total	(2) Daily	(3) Yearly	(4) Total	(5) Daily	(6) Yearly	(7) Total	(8) Daily	(9) Yearly	(10) Remittances	(11) MUE	(12) Index
Panel A: Midline (6 months)												
Home Visit	-306.32	-2066.16	26679.21	448.36	-1872.24	29420.66	26.63	-678.75	32833.45	-4545.00	0.01	-0.03
	(317.41)	(1994.52)	(63079.02)	(565.77)	(2098.24)	(101752.42)	(30.26)	(883.38)	(29612.33)	(6785.23)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Venue-Based	-618.03**	-2397.27	-32319.53	541.67	986.76	16243.83	-14.34	-230.17	22107.17	-10141.86	0.07	-0.01
	(310.94)	(2031.59)	(63364.04)	(552.78)	(2264.89)	(93637.50)	(24.68)	(931.13)	(30954.73)	(6550.79)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Control Mean	3565.36	24696.34	617050.58	6721.88	22881.32	688062.26	22.61	2897.47	80175.10	31172.55	-0.03	-0.02
RW q-val Home	0.96	0.95	0.99	0.97	0.97	0.99	0.97	0.97	0.94	0.97	0.99	0.99
RW q-val Venue	0.43	0.87	1.00	0.96	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.65	0.98	1.00
Home = Venue	0.25	0.86	0.34	0.86	0.15	0.90	0.18	0.59	0.71	0.33	0.49	0.74
Adj. R^2	0.06	0.26	0.38	0.25	0.43	0.41	0.11	0.16	0.16	0.14	0.06	0.13
Observations	836	847	846	345	847	846	345	847	846	822	752	847
Panel B: Endline (18–24 Months)												
Home Visit	692.62	1875.33	46873.24	-394.29	932.96	84568.49	-12.43	-540.96	-15514.09	876.02	0.01	-0.01
	(568.45)	(2114.38)	(66542.74)	(633.32)	(2264.32)	(72320.82)	(18.75)	(858.74)	(19627.89)	(5282.32)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Venue-Based	-373.34	-876.30	-31910.52	-351.19	88.82	-10584.95	-24.04	-1331.56*	-11513.46	-635.10	0.17*	-0.06
	(385.73)	(1985.80)	(66340.10)	(626.35)	(2434.08)	(69937.15)	(18.67)	(755.80)	(18867.99)	(6196.36)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Control Mean	3676.26	25071.71	460647.29	6883.18	22971.20	418437.98	22.15	3101.74	63468.99	25547.62	-0.08	-0.09
RW q-val Home	0.96	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.97	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
RW q-val Venue	0.96	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.82	0.60	1.00	1.00	0.60	0.96
Home = Venue	0.03	0.18	0.19	0.93	0.71	0.18	0.38	0.29	0.81	0.80	0.10	0.39
Adj. R^2	0.05	0.14	0.21	0.29	0.33	0.25	0.08	0.08	0.12	0.07	0.06	0.11
Observations	839	850	849	319	850	849	319	850	849	827	746	850

Notes: We winsorize all expenditure and remittances measures at the 99th percentile. Coefficients are ANCOVA estimates that control for the outcome at baseline, the respondent's location, marital status, household size, number of children, age, network size and level of education. The first three columns are estimates of participants' contributions to household expenditures overall, measured in a daily time frame, based on specific items purchased frequently and based on specific items purchased infrequently. Columns 4-6 are estimates for the participant's spouse, and columns 7-9 are estimates for all other family members in the household. All measures are provided by the participant and are based on her best guess. Remittances show effects on net remittances. We calculate the MUE using consumption expenditures over the past week on seventeen food items, following the methods outlined in Ligon (2020). Higher values of the MUE indicate higher marginal utilities of expenditure, indicating that households are worse off. Index is an M. L. Anderson (2008) index of all outcomes using the swindex command in Stata. We report White robust standard errors in parentheses. *R-W q-val* are Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis test q-values. Q-values include the same controls as above and are computed within pre-registered families of outcomes. Home = Venue reports the p-value from a two-sided test of equality of the coefficients on Home Visit and Venue-Based coaching. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A10: Treatment Effects on Business Outcomes - Partnered Women Only

	(1) Own a Business	(2) Revenue	(3) Revenue (SMS)	(4) Calculated Profits	(5) Profits	(6) Index
			Panel A: Midline (6 months)			
Home Visit	0.126**	1651.401	-1521.941	-3642.299	13966.863	0.097
	(0.050)	(8462.876)	(2972.438)	(8089.600)	(15258.429)	(0.112)
Venue-Based	0.133***	-5850.071	-445.298	-10779.321	10621.980	0.036
	(0.048)	(8014.576)	(2723.476)	(8408.704)	(14534.045)	(0.105)
Control Mean	0.573	41707.143	12708.188	3885.013	82986.076	-0.044
RW q-val Home	0.109	0.950	0.950	0.950	0.812	0.832
RW q-val Venue	0.059	0.921	0.921	0.624	0.921	0.921
Home = Venue	0.869	0.234	0.594	0.310	0.805	0.506
Adj. R^2	0.227	0.218	0.217	-0.004	0.153	0.120
Observations	534	518	267	518	535	535
			Panel B: Endline (18–24 Months)			
Home Visit	0.035	-5305.746	-3309.192	-1415.002	-9439.821	-0.069
	(0.051)	(8434.176)	(4460.264)	(7829.370)	(16830.670)	(0.109)
Venue-Based	0.076	13237.505	-2060.509	9458.679	14696.573	0.113
	(0.050)	(9231.941)	(3361.578)	(8114.419)	(16811.032)	(0.107)
Control Mean	0.662	44534.591	14829.501	5037.107	101888.750	0.117
RW q-val Home	0.970	0.970	0.950	0.970	0.970	0.970
RW q-val Venue	0.485	0.495	0.683	0.683	0.683	0.683
Home = Venue	0.370	0.011	0.643	0.113	0.123	0.055
Adj. R^2	0.110	0.151	0.178	0.008	0.170	0.093
Observations	544	534	256	534	544	544

Notes: The sample is restricted to women who were partnered at baseline. We winsorize all sales and profit measures at the 99th percentile. Coefficients are ANCOVA estimates that control for the outcome at baseline, the respondent's location, marital status, household size, number of children, age, network size and level of education. Revenue presents the reported sales for the 3 days prior to the survey. Revenue (SMS) is the average revenue the day before the SMS survey was received during the relevant period. Calculated Profits are revenues less costs for transport, products, employees, and other operational costs in the three days before the survey. Profits are self-reported profits from the month before using the question from de Mel, D. J. McKenzie, and Woodruff (2009). Index is an M. L. Anderson (2008) index of all outcomes using the swindex command in Stata. We report White robust standard errors in parentheses. *RW q-val* are Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis test q-values. Q-values include the same controls as above and are computed within pre-registered families of outcomes. Home = Venue reports the p-value from a two-sided test of equality of the coefficients on Home Visit and Venue-Based coaching. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A11: Treatment Effects on Business Practices - Partnered Women Only

	(1) Tracking	(2) Price Management	(3) Goat Setting	(4) Work Hours	(5) Index
		Panel A: Midline (6 months)			
Home Visit	0.251	0.551**	0.407**	14.916**	0.328***
	(0.198)	(0.236)	(0.204)	(6.733)	(0.105)
Venue-Based	0.128	0.615***	0.291	15.022**	0.339***
	(0.198)	(0.230)	(0.196)	(6.146)	(0.100)
Control Mean	0.994	0.994	0.717	30.174	-0.077
RW q-val Home	0.178	0.050	0.109	0.059	0.020
RW q-val Venue	0.624	0.050	0.238	0.079	0.010
Home = Venue	0.517	0.761	0.536	0.986	0.915
Adj. R^2	0.142	0.098	0.095	0.159	0.244
Observations	265	260	223	216	533
		Panel B: Endline (18–24 Months)			
Home Visit	0.003	0.186	0.280	8.922	0.092
	(0.202)	(0.229)	(0.182)	(6.682)	(0.111)
Venue-Based	0.101	0.314	0.391**	8.620	0.200*
	(0.201)	(0.231)	(0.194)	(5.957)	(0.111)
Control Mean	1.241	1.269	0.678	37.084	0.103
RW q-val Home	1.000	0.782	0.386	0.455	0.782
RW q-val Venue	0.584	0.347	0.248	0.347	0.297
Home = Venue	0.578	0.544	0.575	0.962	0.316
Adj. R^2	0.067	0.030	0.074	0.079	0.086
Observations	268	258	219	223	543

Notes: The sample is restricted to women who were partnered at baseline. Coefficients are ANCOVA estimates that control for the outcome at baseline, the respondent's location, marital status, household size, number of children, age, network size and level of education. Tracking combines multiple questions about record keeping for the business with a maximum value of 3. Price management combines multiple questions about setting prices, running promotions, comparing prices with competitors, and negotiating for better prices with suppliers with a maximum value of 4. Goal setting combines multiple questions about setting goals for the business over various time horizons with a maximum value of 3. Work hours is the number of hours the respondent typically works in her main business. Index is an M. L. Anderson (2008) index of all outcomes using the swindex command in Stata. We report White robust standard errors in parentheses. *RW q-val* are Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis test q-values. Q-values include the same controls as above and are computed within pre-registered families of outcomes. Home = Venue reports the p-value from a two-sided test of equality of the coefficients on Home Visit and Venue-Based coaching. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A12: Treatment Effects on Savings and Investment - Partnered Women Only

	(1) Savings	(2) Invested in Business (Binary)	(3) Index
Panel A: Midline (6 months)			
Home Visit	33702.699	0.134***	0.258***
	(30380.083)	(0.050)	(0.096)
Venue-Based	-24776.440	0.138***	0.195**
	(28396.559)	(0.048)	(0.094)
Control Mean	154455.844	0.557	-0.081
RW q-val Home	0.347	0.040	0.040
RW q-val Venue	0.376	0.030	0.069
Home = Venue	0.053	0.930	0.495
Adj. R^2	0.208	0.205	0.242
Observations	513	535	535
Panel B: Endline (18–24 Months)			
Home Visit	11725.971	0.050	0.137
	(34395.862)	(0.052)	(0.103)
Venue-Based	6015.050	0.088*	0.168
	(33168.396)	(0.050)	(0.103)
Control Mean	169221.795	0.650	0.069
RW q-val Home	0.762	0.634	0.475
RW q-val Venue	0.832	0.168	0.168
Home = Venue	0.858	0.409	0.753
Adj. R^2	0.134	0.106	0.150
Observations	526	544	544

Notes: The sample is restricted to women who were partnered at baseline. We winsorize our savings measures at the 99th percentile. Coefficients are ANCOVA estimates that control for the outcome at baseline, the respondent's location, marital status, household size, number of children, age, network size and level of education. Savings measures the total amount held across all financial savings instruments. Business Investment is a binary indicator equal to one if the respondent reports having made any investment in her business in the last six months. Index is an M. L. Anderson (2008) index of all outcomes using the swindex command in Stata. We report White robust standard errors in parentheses. *RW q-val* are Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis test q-values. Q-values include the same controls as above and are computed within pre-registered families of outcomes. Home = Venue reports the p-value from a two-sided test of equality of the coefficients on Home Visit and Venue-Based coaching. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A13: Treatment Effects on Psychometric Outcomes - Partnered Women Only

	Locus of Control					Aspirations			
	(1) Internal	(2) Chance	(3) PO	(4) Self Eff.	(5) Grit	(6) Income	(7) Social Status	(8) Education	(9) Index
Panel A: Midline (6 months)									
Home Visit	0.314	0.529	0.045	0.035	0.677	-460433.366	-0.174	0.021	0.022
	(0.262)	(0.424)	(0.518)	(0.725)	(0.666)	(287123.495)	(0.114)	(0.127)	(0.096)
Venue-Based	-0.200	0.542	0.106	0.321	1.428**	-40792.902	0.112	-0.078	0.120
	(0.272)	(0.419)	(0.503)	(0.720)	(0.623)	(315882.604)	(0.111)	(0.130)	(0.097)
Control Mean	15.694	-14.726	-13.025	38.172	28.975	1539873.239	3.109	4.293	-0.046
RW q-val Home	0.743	0.743	1.000	1.000	0.752	0.604	0.604	1.000	1.000
RW q-val Venue	0.960	0.723	0.980	0.970	0.188	0.980	0.851	0.970	0.723
Home = Venue	0.052	0.974	0.897	0.683	0.200	0.152	0.007	0.419	0.283
Adj. R^2	0.027	0.086	0.158	0.065	0.091	-0.008	0.052	0.079	0.095
Observations	530	531	530	530	531	427	525	480	533
Panel B: Endline (18–24 Months)									
Home Visit	-0.002	-0.489	0.234	-0.605	-0.721	-601423.739**	-0.064	-0.109	-0.148
	(0.309)	(0.436)	(0.564)	(0.760)	(0.633)	(259570.696)	(0.113)	(0.141)	(0.105)
Venue-Based	0.235	-0.279	0.227	0.624	1.195*	-386215.494	0.006	0.019	0.056
	(0.313)	(0.437)	(0.569)	(0.768)	(0.633)	(262789.958)	(0.104)	(0.136)	(0.107)
Control Mean	15.774	-13.994	-12.472	39.145	30.025	1660472.973	3.045	4.144	0.036
RW q-val Home	0.960	0.802	0.901	0.901	0.802	0.208	0.901	0.901	0.624
RW q-val Venue	0.960	0.960	0.980	0.960	0.327	0.743	1.000	1.000	0.970
Home = Venue	0.407	0.617	0.988	0.090	0.001	0.277	0.495	0.330	0.038
Adj. R^2	0.026	0.042	0.043	0.068	0.098	0.076	0.019	0.080	0.079
Observations	539	540	539	539	540	436	531	474	542

Notes: The sample is restricted to women who were partnered at baseline. Coefficients are ANCOVA estimates that control for the outcome at baseline, the respondent's location, marital status, household size, number of children, age, network size and level of education. We draw our locus of control measures from Levenson (1973). Internal, PO, and Chance is the dimension of the locus of control score. Positive values for Internal, PO and Chance provide evidence of improvements in locus of control measures independent of type. Our measures of grit follow Angela L. Duckworth et al. (2007) and Angela Lee Duckworth and Quinn (2009). We measure generalized self-efficacy following Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995). Income and Social Status measure the gap between the respondent's current level and the level she aspires to attain in ten years in each respective domain. Education Aspirations measures what is the respondent education aspiration for her children. We winsorize the income aspirations variable at the 99th percentile. Index is an M. L. Anderson (2008) index of all outcomes using the swindex command in Stata. We report White robust standard errors in parentheses. *RW q-val* are Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis test q-values. Q-values include the same controls as above and are computed within pre-registered families of outcomes. Home = Venue reports the p-value from a two-sided test of equality of the coefficients on Home Visit and Venue-Based coaching. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A14: Treatment Effects on Consumption - Partnered Women Only

	Participant's			Spouses			Other HH Members					
	(1) Total	(2) Daily	(3) Yearly	(4) Total	(5) Daily	(6) Yearly	(7) Total	(8) Daily	(9) Yearly	(10) Remittances	(11) MUE	(12) Index
Panel A: Midline (6 months)												
Home Visit	-949.47**	-4380.58*	-51479.29	527.02	-2075.91	144051.40	30.83	-719.20	35763.59	2725.72	0.12	-0.02
	(422.90)	(2558.98)	(73825.64)	(572.79)	(3151.53)	(157881.55)	(31.50)	(717.79)	(33617.56)	(7677.31)	(0.11)	(0.08)
Venue-Based	-1102.31**	-6082.73**	-103072.03	466.76	1179.85	60307.16	-15.38	-546.16	21478.33	-1078.04	0.13	-0.04
	(427.82)	(2602.87)	(70437.73)	(560.42)	(3413.65)	(146326.40)	(25.09)	(701.71)	(32936.46)	(6672.62)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Control Mean	3683.41	23222.53	507873.42	6636.96	33772.78	1060829.11	23.85	1208.23	44449.37	22987.26	-0.06	-0.13
RW q-val Home	0.35	0.64	0.96	0.94	0.96	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.96	0.92	0.96
RW q-val Venue	0.19	0.32	0.81	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.93	1.00
Home = Venue	0.63	0.41	0.45	0.91	0.27	0.60	0.16	0.76	0.58	0.57	0.97	0.75
Adj. R^2	0.05	0.26	0.34	0.25	0.32	0.35	0.11	-0.04	0.09	0.13	0.07	0.06
Observations	529	535	534	334	535	534	334	535	534	520	477	535
Panel B: Endline (18–24 Months)												
Home Visit	338.16	1284.47	-23170.68	-325.09	-1642.07	152335.49	-11.96	740.80	6964.33	1117.76	-0.12	0.02
	(666.75)	(2609.24)	(62995.68)	(647.38)	(3433.39)	(114522.48)	(19.05)	(977.69)	(15693.45)	(5786.24)	(0.12)	(0.08)
Venue-Based	-179.56	86.74	-91684.76*	-452.42	-1397.02	-30099.21	-24.52	-965.77	-7003.11	6448.59	0.11	-0.05
	(547.92)	(2490.49)	(55618.19)	(638.71)	(3651.21)	(110565.08)	(18.91)	(750.04)	(14361.97)	(7610.24)	(0.12)	(0.07)
Control Mean	3482.94	22463.44	355015.62	7049.34	33614.81	650400.00	24.59	1538.75	25400.00	19414.01	-0.02	-0.18
RW q-val Home	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.91	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.98	1.00
RW q-val Venue	0.99	0.99	0.72	0.96	0.99	0.99	0.87	0.87	0.98	0.96	0.94	0.96
Home = Venue	0.41	0.64	0.15	0.80	0.94	0.09	0.37	0.05	0.34	0.43	0.06	0.28
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.11	0.15	0.29	0.23	0.21	0.08	0.08	0.20	0.08	0.07	0.18
Observations	537	544	543	308	544	543	308	544	543	530	479	544

Notes: The sample is restricted to women who were partnered at baseline. We winsorize all expenditure and remittances measures at the 99th percentile. Coefficients are ANCOVA estimates that control for the outcome at baseline, the respondent's location, marital status, household size, number of children, age, network size and level of education. The first three columns are estimates of participants' contributions to household expenditures overall, measured in a daily time frame, based on specific items purchased frequently and based on specific items purchased infrequently. Columns 4-6 are estimates for the participant's spouse, and columns 7-9 are estimates for all other family members in the household. All measures are provided by the participant and are based on her best guess. Remittances show effects on net remittances. We calculate the MUE using consumption expenditures over the past week on seventeen food items, following the methods outlined in Ligon (2020). Higher values of the MUE indicate higher marginal utilities of expenditure, indicating that households are worse off. Index is an M. L. Anderson (2008) index of all outcomes using the swindex command in Stata. We report White robust standard errors in parentheses. *R-W q-val* are Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis test q-values. Q-values include the same controls as above and are computed within pre-registered families of outcomes. Home = Venue reports the p-value from a two-sided test of equality of the coefficients on Home Visit and Venue-Based coaching. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A15: Treatment Effects on Network Centrality Outcomes - Partnered Women Only

	(1) In-Degree	(2) Out-Degree	(3) Centrality of Most Central Link	(4) Eigenvector Centrality	(5) Index
			Panel A: Midline (6 months)		
Home Visit	1.006***	0.745**	0.011**	0.008***	0.290***
	(0.302)	(0.304)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.070)
Venue-Based	1.021***	0.716**	0.009*	0.008***	0.271***
	(0.319)	(0.309)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.070)
Control Mean	4.462	5.456	0.115	0.051	-0.206
RW q-value Home	0.010	0.020	0.040	0.010	0.010
RW q-value Venue	0.010	0.050	0.119	0.010	0.010
Home = Venueue	0.966	0.930	0.683	0.749	0.792
Adj. R^2	0.633	0.214	0.268	0.504	0.486
Observations	535	535	535	535	535
			Panel B: Endline(12–18 months)		
Home Visit	0.964***	0.422	0.012**	0.006***	0.282***
	(0.315)	(0.384)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.085)
Venue-Based	0.573*	0.156	-0.002	0.002	0.082
	(0.319)	(0.366)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.080)
Control Mean	4.781	6.050	0.116	0.053	-0.095
RW q-value Home	0.020	0.267	0.069	0.020	0.020
RW q-value Venue	0.178	0.941	0.941	0.366	0.515
Home = Venueue	0.242	0.469	0.004	0.039	0.016
Adj. R^2	0.679	0.134	0.203	0.496	0.401
Observations	544	544	544	544	544

Notes: The sample is restricted to women who were partnered at baseline. Coefficients are ANCOVA estimates that control for the outcome at baseline, the respondent's location, marital status, household size, number of children, age, network size, and level of education. In-Degree and Out-Degree measure the number of incoming and outgoing ties, respectively, in the directed social network. Centrality of Most Central Link measures the highest eigenvector centrality among alters in the respondent's network. Eigenvector Centrality measures the extent to which the respondent is connected to alters who themselves are well connected within the network. Index is an M. L. Anderson (2008) index that aggregates In-Degree, Out-Degree, and Centrality of Most Central Link, and excludes the respondent's own eigenvector centrality, using the swindex command in Stata. We report White robust standard errors in parentheses and Romano-Wolf correct q-values at the bottom of each panel. Home = Venue reports the p-value from a two-sided test of equality of the coefficients on Home Visit and Venue-Based coaching. Note that we did not pre-specify a woman's own eigenvector centrality; however, including it in our multiple-inference corrections does not alter which pre-registered outcomes achieve each significance level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A16: Romano-Wolf q-values: Household Decision-Making

	Home Visit	Venue-Based
Use of Savings	0.8911	0.8515
Joint Account	0.5743	0.9505
Control Participant's Earnings	0.5743	0.9505
Control Spouse's Earnings	0.8911	0.9505
Woman Working	0.8911	0.9505

Notes: Romano-Wolf q-values associated with odd-numbered columns in Table 4.

Table A17: Romano-Wolf q-values: Household Decision-Making Accounting for Social Desirability Bias

	Home Visit	Venue-Based	HSD	Home x HSD	Venue x HSD
Use of Savings	0.6139	0.8218	1.0000	0.7822	0.9505
Joint Account	0.5545	1.0000	1.0000	0.9505	0.9505
Control Participant's Earnings	0.6139	1.0000	1.0000	0.9505	0.9208
Control Spouse's Earnings	0.8614	0.4851	0.5347	0.9505	0.0891
Woman Working	0.8614	1.0000	0.3564	0.9505	0.9505

Notes: Romano-Wolf q-values associated with even-numbered columns in Table 4. HSD is an indicator variable equal to one for women with above-median social desirability bias.

Table A18: Romano-Wolf q-values: Intimate Partner Violence

	Home Visit	Venue-Based
Has Been Abused - Ever	0.9703	0.9802
Has Been Abused - Last 12 Months	0.8218	0.9208
Abuse Index - Ever	0.9406	0.9802
Abuse Index - Last 12 Months	0.9703	0.9802
Told Anyone	0.9703	0.9208
Sought Authorities	0.9703	0.9802

Notes: Romano-Wolf q-values associated with odd-numbered columns in Table 6.

Table A19: Romano-Wolf q-values: Intimate Partner Violence Accounting for Social Desirability Bias

	Home Visit	Venue-Based	HSD	Home x HSD	Venue x HSD
Has Been Abused - Ever	0.5743	0.9703	0.3465	0.3762	1.0000
Has Been Abused - Last 12 Months	0.3069	0.9703	0.2079	0.3465	1.0000
Abuse Index - Ever	0.3861	0.9703	0.3564	0.3465	1.0000
Abuse Index - Last 12 Months	0.5743	0.9703	0.1287	0.3465	0.9802
Told Anyone	0.7624	0.9703	0.9604	0.6931	1.0000
Sought Authorities	0.7624	0.9703	0.9604	0.6931	1.0000

Notes: Romano-Wolf q-values associated with even-numbered columns in Table 6. HSD is an indicator variable equal to one for women with above-median social desirability bias.

Table A20: Treatment Effects on Individual Questions of the Abused Index

	(1) Insulted	(2) Humiliated	(3) Intimidated	(4) Threatened	(5) Slapped	(6) Pushed	(7) Hit you	(8) Kicked or dragged	(9) Choked or burnt	(10) Used weapons	(11) Forced Intercourse	(12) Sex under intimidation	(13) Degrading sexual act
Panel A: Ever been Abused													
Home Visit	-0.084	-0.063	-0.126*	-0.066	-0.116*	-0.114**	-0.090*	-0.111**	-0.005	-0.029	-0.024	-0.052	0.046
	(0.090)	(0.063)	(0.069)	(0.058)	(0.066)	(0.058)	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.062)	(0.068)	(0.033)
Venue-Based	0.045	0.005	-0.042	-0.047	0.006	0.038	0.023	-0.091*	0.010	-0.019	0.015	0.020	0.053
	(0.092)	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.062)	(0.074)	(0.067)	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.067)	(0.077)	(0.041)
HSD	-0.084	-0.012	-0.032	-0.006	-0.089	-0.104	-0.039	-0.110**	-0.019	-0.032	-0.085	-0.122	0.008
	(0.125)	(0.089)	(0.092)	(0.083)	(0.088)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.051)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.027)
Home x HSD	0.100	0.095	0.100	0.066	0.114	0.178**	0.075	0.119*	0.025	0.069*	0.099	0.149	-0.018
	(0.155)	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.097)	(0.105)	(0.086)	(0.077)	(0.066)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.095)	(0.100)	(0.041)
Venue x HSD	-0.136	-0.038	-0.031	0.039	0.006	-0.039	0.001	0.135*	-0.022	0.063	0.028	0.008	0.007
	(0.160)	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.093)	(0.091)	(0.081)	(0.032)	(0.050)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.057)
Control Mean	0.543	0.171	0.190	0.114	0.162	0.105	0.086	0.095	0.010	0.019	0.135	0.152	0.010
Home=Venue	0.121	0.274	0.162	0.715	0.059	0.007	0.012	0.679	0.625	0.669	0.543	0.295	0.853
HomexHSD=VenuexHSD	0.096	0.180	0.170	0.772	0.293	0.013	0.353	0.836	0.262	0.897	0.481	0.164	0.640
Home+HSD+HomexHSD=0	0.520	0.766	0.438	0.932	0.231	0.563	0.353	0.042	0.964	0.816	0.898	0.743	0.285
Venue+HSD+VenuexHSD=0	0.114	0.568	0.204	0.861	0.371	0.125	0.833	0.339	0.118	0.743	0.582	0.238	0.144
Adj. R^2	-0.022	0.029	0.023	-0.051	-0.031	-0.011	-0.005	-0.061	-0.084	0.050	-0.012	-0.028	-0.060
Observations	393	393	393	393	393	392	393	392	393	393	391	393	393
Panel B: Last 12 Months													
Home Visit	-0.157*	-0.027	-0.093	-0.060	-0.059	-0.108**	-0.101**	-0.080**	0.006	0.005	-0.038	-0.059	0.026
	(0.086)	(0.058)	(0.063)	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.054)	(0.064)	(0.030)
Venue-Based	-0.048	0.005	-0.048	-0.070	-0.011	-0.019	-0.039	-0.040	0.031	0.015	-0.005	-0.005	0.023
	(0.090)	(0.060)	(0.064)	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.046)	(0.041)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.059)	(0.073)	(0.034)
HSD	-0.176	-0.047	-0.113	-0.075	-0.056	-0.111**	-0.060	-0.089**	0.003	-0.006	-0.118*	-0.150**	-0.012
	(0.113)	(0.075)	(0.069)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.038)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.023)
Home x HSD	0.154	0.079	0.167*	0.099	0.065	0.165***	0.111*	0.108**	0.013	0.042	0.127*	0.163*	-0.015
	(0.140)	(0.098)	(0.090)	(0.077)	(0.070)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.048)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.076)	(0.084)	(0.033)
Venue x HSD	0.082	-0.016	0.069	0.098	-0.004	0.052	0.021	0.084	-0.048*	0.029	0.101	0.086	0.040
	(0.147)	(0.099)	(0.093)	(0.086)	(0.081)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.063)	(0.026)	(0.044)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.050)
Control Mean	0.362	0.105	0.133	0.086	0.067	0.067	0.067	0.048	0.000	0.000	0.077	0.105	0.010
Home=Venue	0.170	0.576	0.416	0.830	0.315	0.055	0.084	0.278	0.345	0.610	0.571	0.409	0.943
HomexHSD=VenuexHSD	0.571	0.290	0.244	0.988	0.330	0.124	0.143	0.675	0.112	0.779	0.782	0.415	0.250
Home+HSD+HomexHSD=0	0.063	0.923	0.562	0.542	0.313	0.332	0.297	0.078	0.448	0.154	0.664	0.504	0.954
Venue+HSD+VenuexHSD=0	0.158	0.429	0.217	0.461	0.237	0.199	0.127	0.408	0.314	0.182	0.746	0.371	0.245
Adj. R^2	0.012	0.024	0.038	-0.013	-0.038	-0.053	-0.027	0.011	-0.107	0.077	-0.068	-0.042	-0.049
Observations	393	393	393	393	393	392	393	392	393	393	391	393	393

Notes: The sample is restricted to women who were partnered at baseline. Coefficients are OLS estimates that control for the respondent's location, household size, the number of children, and age at baseline. The dependent variables in the table are the disaggregated questions of the Abused Index and the Abused Index in the last 12 months. They describe behaviors the current partner may have had towards the respondent. Each outcome is a binary variable equal to one if the respondent reports having endured the behavior/action. We report White robust standard errors in parentheses. Home = Venue reports the p-value from a two-sided test of equality of the coefficients on Home Visit and Venue-Based coaching. HomexHSD=VenuexHSD corresponds to the p-value for the null hypothesis that the estimates for Home Visit coachingxHSD and Venue-Based coachingxHSD are equal. Home+HSD+HomexHSD=0 corresponds to the p-value for the null hypothesis that Home Visits coaching + HSD + Home coachingxHSD = 0. Venue+HSD+VenuexHSD=0 corresponds to the p-value for the null hypothesis that Venue-Based coaching + HSD + Venue-Based coachingxHSD = 0. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, ***, $p < 0.01$.

Table A21: Treatment Effects on Attitudes Towards IPV for Partnered Women

	Participant's Attitudes						Spouse Behavior	
	Wife		IPV		Refusing Sex		Controling Behavior	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Home Visit	0.125	0.031	0.114	0.237	0.046	-0.141	-0.466*	-0.531
	(0.170)	(0.208)	(0.133)	(0.170)	(0.171)	(0.228)	(0.278)	(0.356)
Venue-Based	-0.094	-0.123	0.040	0.026	-0.291	-0.349	-0.419	-0.401
	(0.171)	(0.197)	(0.119)	(0.154)	(0.198)	(0.242)	(0.292)	(0.377)
HSD		-0.360		-0.091		-0.046		0.066
		(0.291)		(0.190)		(0.292)		(0.453)
Home x HSD		0.303		-0.297		0.484		0.156
		(0.363)		(0.243)		(0.345)		(0.563)
Venue x HSD		0.117		0.062		0.164		-0.060
		(0.392)		(0.261)		(0.397)		(0.597)
Control Mean	3.256	3.256	0.416	0.416	3.168	3.168	2.220	2.220
Home=Venue	0.166	0.416	0.569	0.194	0.066	0.377	0.848	0.669
HomexHSD=VenuexHSD		0.585		0.127		0.357		0.673
Home+HSD+HomexHSD=0		0.911		0.431		0.176		0.459
Venue+HSD+VenuexHSD=0		0.168		0.987		0.426		0.341
Adj. R^2	-0.012	-0.013	-0.058	-0.051	0.013	0.015	-0.025	-0.032
Observations	445	445	445	445	445	445	437	437

Notes: The sample is restricted to women who were partnered at baseline. Coefficients are OLS estimates that control for the respondent's location, household size, number of minors in the household, and age of the respondent at baseline. Wife Attitudes Index is a continuous variable equal to the aggregate score of attitudes toward women's roles in marriage and family life, with higher values indicating more traditional views. Attitudes about IPV Index is a continuous variable equal to the aggregate score of attitudes regarding the acceptability of intimate partner violence under specific circumstances, with higher values indicating greater acceptance of IPV. Sex Refusal Score is a continuous variable equal to the aggregate score of attitudes regarding whether a woman can refuse to have sex with her husband under specific circumstances, with higher values indicating less willingness to refuse sex. Controlling Behavior Index is a continuous variable equal to the aggregate score of behaviors indicating control by the respondent's current or most recent husband/partner, such as limiting contact with friends or family, monitoring whereabouts, restricting access to healthcare, or displaying jealousy. Higher values indicate more controlling behavior by the spouse. We report White robust standard errors in parentheses. Home = Venue reports the p-value from a two-sided test of equality of the coefficients on Home Visit and Venue-Based coaching. HomexHSD=VenuexHSD corresponds to the p-value for the null hypothesis that the estimates for Home Visit coachingxHSD and Venue-Based coachingxHSD are equal. Home+HSD+HomexHSD=0 corresponds to the p-value for the null hypothesis that Home Visit coaching + HSD + Home coachingxHSD = 0. Venue+HSD+VenuexHSD=0 corresponds to the p-value for the null hypothesis that Venue-Based coaching + HSD + Venue-Based coachingxHSD = 0. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, ***, $p < 0.01$.

Table A22: Treatment Effects on Partnership Decisions

	Partnered		Divorced after Baseline	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Midline (6 months)				
Home Visit	0.053*	0.035	-0.051***	-0.063***
	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.018)	(0.021)
Venue-Based	0.048	0.024	-0.054***	-0.043
	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.019)	(0.027)
HSD		-0.020		-0.002
		(0.056)		(0.036)
Home x HSD		0.045		0.033
		(0.070)		(0.042)
Venue x HSD		0.059		-0.038
		(0.080)		(0.042)
Control Mean	0.548	0.548	0.062	0.062
Home=Venue	0.857	0.779	0.794	0.334
HomexHSD=VenuexHSD		0.841		0.035
Home+HSD+HomexHSD=0		0.215		0.300
Venue+HSD+VenuexHSD=0		0.261		0.001
Adj. R^2	0.576	0.570	0.064	0.068
Observations	708	669	708	669
Panel B: Endline (18–24 Months)				
Home Visit	0.063*	0.091**	-0.051**	-0.075**
	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.025)	(0.029)
Venue-Based	0.013	0.032	-0.044*	-0.050
	(0.038)	(0.045)	(0.026)	(0.031)
HSD		0.029		-0.029
		(0.058)		(0.041)
Home x HSD		-0.076		0.066
		(0.075)		(0.052)
Venue x HSD		-0.058		0.021
		(0.075)		(0.051)
Control Mean	0.582	0.582	0.087	0.087
Home=Venue	0.141	0.162	0.740	0.354
HomexHSD=VenuexHSD		0.798		0.327
Home+HSD+HomexHSD=0		0.422		0.339
Venue+HSD+VenuexHSD=0		0.956		0.095
Adj. R^2	0.479	0.477	0.018	0.016
Observations	710	709	710	709

Notes: Columns 1-2 present ANCOVA estimates coefficients that control for the outcome at baseline, the respondent's location, household size, number of children, and age of the respondent at baseline. Columns 3-4 present OLS estimates coefficients that control for the respondent's location, household size, number of children, and age of the respondent at baseline. Partnered is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the participant reported being married/cohabiting. Divorced after baseline is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the women reported being married/cohabitating at baseline, and reported being divorced afterward. All columns exclude location 1. We report White robust standard errors in parentheses. Home = Venue reports the p-value from a two-sided test of equality of the coefficients on Home Visit and Venue-Based coaching. HomexHSD=VenuexHSD corresponds to the p-value for the null hypothesis that the estimates for Home Visit coachingxHSD and Venue-Based coachingxHSD are equal. Home+HSD+HomexHSD=0 corresponds to the p-value for the null hypothesis that Home Visit coaching + HSD + Home coachingxHSD = 0. Venue+HSD+VenuexHSD=0 corresponds to the p-value for the null hypothesis that Venue-Based coaching + HSD + Venue-Based coachingxHSD = 0. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, ***, $p < 0.01$.

Table A23: Treatment Effects on Business Outcomes by Baseline Business Ownership

	(1) Own a Business	(2) Revenue	(3) Revenue (SMS)	(4) Calculated Profits	(5) Profits	(6) Index
			Panel A: Midline (6 months)			
Home Visit	0.154**	-4042.047	602.839	815.426	34561.924**	0.204*
	(0.061)	(9166.663)	(2170.631)	(7182.002)	(14900.148)	(0.108)
Venue-Based	0.215***	-2360.139	1855.151	-6152.841	42489.356***	0.240**
	(0.061)	(8995.183)	(2243.288)	(7156.256)	(14030.854)	(0.105)
Baseline Business (BB)	0.411***	-12282.947	5778.086*	-1294.931	48379.567***	0.274*
	(0.057)	(8976.625)	(3077.585)	(9529.057)	(17125.000)	(0.151)
Home x BB	-0.014	15369.509	-3591.019	-2627.651	-35021.885	-0.143
	(0.075)	(12435.562)	(3908.699)	(12383.771)	(26082.744)	(0.163)
Venue x BB	-0.100	11124.678	-3933.834	8782.368	-42201.245*	-0.155
	(0.075)	(12436.911)	(3709.785)	(11864.085)	(24438.434)	(0.157)
Control Mean	0.566	37674.603	13738.804	3742.825	87551.362	-0.032
Home = Venue	0.310	0.840	0.527	0.225	0.638	0.718
HomexBB=VenuexBB	0.217	0.706	0.917	0.300	0.773	0.931
Home+BB+HomexBB=0	0.000	0.917	0.302	0.722	0.004	0.019
Venue+BB+VenuexBB=0	0.000	0.723	0.154	0.875	0.001	0.021
Adj. R^2	0.224	0.189	0.312	-0.005	0.189	0.162
Observations	845	824	444	824	846	846
			Panel B: Endline (18–24 Months)			
Home Visit	0.045	-5712.186	2275.769	391.542	-3290.652	0.016
	(0.063)	(8249.580)	(3645.307)	(6419.512)	(13365.048)	(0.106)
Venue-Based	0.101	12613.015	-624.588	8588.911	14299.179	0.160
	(0.064)	(9084.581)	(2218.227)	(7249.453)	(14534.036)	(0.117)
Baseline Business (BB)	0.304***	11406.522	4381.598	-73.886	31134.432*	0.185
	(0.059)	(10629.613)	(3356.419)	(8753.152)	(18729.562)	(0.147)
Home x BB	-0.036	1307.288	-3867.345	5578.195	1694.085	-0.033
	(0.078)	(12934.533)	(5103.274)	(11962.762)	(25290.001)	(0.164)
Venue x BB	-0.063	-5112.841	1673.512	3216.510	-7093.947	-0.048
	(0.078)	(13610.257)	(4941.132)	(11846.275)	(25106.122)	(0.168)
Control Mean	0.667	43628.016	13661.314	3776.265	95054.651	0.077
Home = Venue	0.350	0.017	0.402	0.214	0.200	0.190
HomexBB=VenuexBB	0.718	0.597	0.275	0.834	0.708	0.925
Home+BB+HomexBB=0	0.000	0.454	0.312	0.483	0.090	0.249
Venue+BB+VenuexBB=0	0.000	0.056	0.112	0.129	0.028	0.060
Adj. R^2	0.102	0.167	0.147	0.001	0.150	0.091
Observations	850	835	409	835	850	850

Notes: We winsorize all sales and profit measures at the 99th percentile. Coefficients are ANCOVA estimates that allow for heterogeneous treatment effects by baseline business ownership and control for the baseline value of the outcome, respondent location, marital status, household size, number of children, age, network size, and education. Revenue presents the reported sales for the 3 days prior to the survey. Revenue (SMS) is the average revenue the day before the SMS survey was received during the relevant period. Calculated Profits are revenues less costs for transport, products, employees, and other operational costs in the three days before the survey. Profits are self-reported profits from the month before using the question from de Mel, D. J. McKenzie, and Woodruff (2009). Business Index is an M. L. Anderson (2008) index of all outcomes using the swindex command in Stata. We report White robust standard errors in parentheses. Home = Venue reports the p-value from a two-sided test of equality of the coefficients on Home Visit and Venue-Based coaching. HomexBB = VenuexBB reports the p-value for equality of interaction effects. Home + BB + HomexBB = 0 and Venue + BB + VenuexBB = 0 report p-values for tests of zero total effects among women with baseline businesses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

B Deviations from the Pre-Analysis Plan

Our pre-analysis plan specifies a larger number of outcomes for the intrahousehold analysis. These outcomes were meant to be collected during a survey done separately with the spouses of women participating in the study at endline, as well as during lab-in-the-field games that we were planning to have couples participate in together. Unfortunately, our funding for these add-on activities was pulled during the COVID-19 lockdown in Uganda, so we could only complete the part of the analysis that relied on adding questions to the planned endline survey of women in our sample.

We collected data at baseline and endline for the children of women in our sample. The pre-registered results for the children's analysis are available in Lang and Seither (2022), but we omit them in the current paper for brevity.

We had initially pre-registered a fixed effects specification as our preferred specification; however, we came to realize that it was important to study the midline and endline results separately, for which an ANCOVA specification gives us better precision.

Finally, we would like to reiterate that the results in Table 3 and Table 5 are exploratory and were not pre-registsered.

C Spillovers

To estimate network-based spillover effects on women in the control group, we combine our ITT estimating equation with a specification similar to that used in Fafchamps, Vaz, and Vicente (2020). This specification allows us to estimate the effect of each treated woman in the baseline social network of a woman in the control group, controlling for the overall size of a woman's baseline social network. The identifying assumption is that, conditional on the size of a woman's social network at baseline, the number of treated women in her network is random. Random assignment to treatment ensures that this identifying assumption holds.

The effect of each treated woman in the baseline social network provides an estimate of the spillovers from the program, similar to the approach in Miguel and Kremer (2004). We estimate these effects using the specification

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \eta_1 \sum_p \text{Home}_{ip0} + \eta_s \sum_p \text{Venue}_{ip0} + \delta \sum_p g_{ip0} + \delta_1 X_i + \delta_2 O_{i0} + \epsilon_{it}. \quad (3)$$

In this estimating equation, $\sum_p Treated_{ip0}$ is the weighted sum of treated women identified by woman i in the control group at baseline, where weights correct for each woman's position within the photobook. Weighting in this way allows us to interpret η_1 and η_2 as the effect from each additional baseline connection with a woman assigned to home visits and venue-based coaching, respectively. $\sum_p g_{ip0}$ controls for the overall number of women in the study to whom a woman is connected at baseline, again using weighted sums of network connections. We control for location fixed effects, marital status, household size, number of children, age, network size, education, and the lagged outcome variable.

Table A24 shows spillovers for the index variables associated with each of our families of pre-registered outcomes, estimated for women in the control group at endline. We find no evidence that being connected to more treated women at baseline changes outcomes at endline for women in the control group when considering all types of network links. There are marginally significant effects on consumption for women in the control group who are connected to women assigned to home visits when we consider friendship or social network links in the second panel of Table A24. We observe no significant spillovers when considering business links in the bottom panel, though effects on business performance and business practices are qualitatively larger than those we estimate for other types of network links.

Table A24: Spillover Effects at Endline

	(1) Business Performance	(2) Business Practices	(3) Investment	(4) Psychometric	(5) Consumption
			Panel A: Any Network Link		
Link - Home	0.019	-0.002	-0.124	0.061	-0.038
	(0.078)	(0.069)	(0.073)	(0.060)	(0.055)
Link - Venue	0.068	0.055	-0.030	0.004	-0.040
	(0.076)	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.063)	(0.059)
Adj. R^2	0.157	0.101	0.178	0.080	0.053
Observations	253	253	253	253	253
			Panel B: Friendship Link		
Link - Home	-0.004	-0.083	-0.027	0.078	-0.124*
	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.060)	(0.068)	(0.049)
Link - Venue	-0.005	0.080	0.028	-0.111	0.025
	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.050)	(0.068)	(0.048)
Adj. R^2	0.153	0.107	0.160	0.088	0.070
Observations	253	253	253	253	253
			Panel C: Business Link		
Link - Home	-0.156	-0.220	-0.140	-0.004	-0.143
	(0.104)	(0.134)	(0.093)	(0.112)	(0.079)
Link - Venue	0.120	0.211	0.207	0.042	-0.020
	(0.114)	(0.126)	(0.144)	(0.140)	(0.090)
Adj. R^2	0.160	0.117	0.173	0.075	0.061
Observations	253	253	253	253	253

Note: Estimates of spillovers to women in the control group estimated at endline using baseline social network data. Coefficients are ANCOVA estimates that control for the outcome at baseline, and overall network size at baseline in all regressions. We show effects on the index variables for each of our pre-registered families. Additionally, we control for the respondent's location, marital status, household size, number of children, age, and level of education. We report White robust standard errors.* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, ***, $p < 0.01$.

D Variable definitions

D.1 Baseline Covariates

All covariates described in this section are values the respondent reported at the baseline survey.

- **Location**: Set of dummy variables equal to one for the location where the respondent was enrolled in the study.
- **Marital Status**: Set of dummy variables that indicate the participant's marital status. Participants answer whether they are married, single, widowed, or divorced. The categories are mutually exclusive, and we exclude the category "single" because it is the largest group.
- **Household Size**: Set of dummy variables that indicate the number of people (adults and children) who regularly eat and sleep in the respondent's household.
- **Number of Children**: Set of dummy variables that indicate the number of dependents under 18 years old living in the respondent's household.
- **Age**: The respondent's age is calculated as the difference between the year the respondent was born and when the baseline survey was conducted. When the age is missing, we imputed the median value and control for a dummy flagging the change.
- **Education**: Set of dummy variables that indicate the participant's highest educational attainment. Participants can have no education, at least primary or secondary education, or a higher education degree. The excluded category is whether the participant has more than a secondary education.
- **Father's Education**: Set of dummy variables that indicate the participant's father's highest educational attainment. The father can have no education, at least primary or

secondary education, or a higher education degree. The excluded category is whether they have more than a secondary education.

- **Mother's Education**: Set of dummy variables that indicate the participant's mother's highest educational attainment. The mother can have no education, at least primary or secondary education, or a higher education degree. The excluded category is whether they have more than a secondary education.

- **Employed**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers yes to the question, "Are you presently employed?", zero if the respondent answers no, and missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer.

- **Network size**: Total number of connections the participant recognizes from the location's photobook used during the survey, weighted by where the picture of the identified person is inside the photobook.

D.2 Take-up Outcomes

- **Module Attendance**: Continuous variable measuring the total number of classroom training modules attended by the participant. This variable ranges from 0 to 8, corresponding to the eight modules offered as part of the program.

- **Attended 7–8 Modules**: Binary indicator equal to one if the participant attended at least seven of the eight classroom training modules, and zero otherwise.

- **Coaching Sessions**: Continuous variable measuring the total number of one-on-one coaching sessions completed by the participant with an NGO coach. This variable ranges from 0 to 3, corresponding to the maximum number of coaching sessions offered.

D.3 Business Outcomes

D.3.1 Business Performance

- **Own a business**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers yes to the question, "Do you currently own a business or engage in self-employment in any way?", zero if the respondent answers no, and missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer.

- **Revenue**: The amount of the revenue reported each day for the five best-sold items in the respondent's business in the three days before the survey in UGX. We winsorize sales at the 99th percentile. We use the midpoint of intervals whenever the respondent cannot provide a number and missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer. In case the respondent has no business, we replace it with 0.

- **Revenue (SMS)**: Continuous variable measuring average daily revenue reported via SMS surveys. This variable is constructed as the average revenue reported for the day prior to each SMS survey received during the month before, the month of, and the month after the in-person survey. We winsorize revenues at the 99th percentile. In case the respondent has no business, we replace this variable with 0.

- **Calculated Profits**: Continuous variable measuring profits calculated by the researchers as total revenues minus reported costs for transport, products, employees, and other operational expenses incurred in the three days prior to the survey. We winsorize calculated profits at the 99th percentile. In case the respondent has no business, we replace this variable with 0.

- **Profits**: Continuous variable measuring self-reported profits from the respondent's main business in the month prior to the survey, using the question from de Mel, D. J. McKenzie, and Woodruff (2009). We winsorize profits at the 99th percentile. We use the midpoint of intervals whenever the respondent cannot provide an exact amount, and

set the variable to missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer. In case the respondent has no business, we replace this variable with 0.

- **Business Performance Index**: Summary index constructed following M. L. Anderson (2008), aggregating all business performance outcomes listed above. The index is constructed using the `swindex` command in Stata.

D.3.2 Business Practices

- **Tracking**: Score that can take values between 0 and 3. The tacking score depends on the number of "yes" responses to the questions: (1) have a system for keeping track of their business activities, (2) keep track of which customers buy from them on credit, and (3) keep track of how much inventory they have. Set to missing if the respondent does not answer any of the three questions.

- **Price Management**: Score that can take values between 0 and 4. The price management score depends on the number of "yes" responses to the questions: (1) compared alternative suppliers for their business in the past six months, (2) visited a competitor to see what products they were offering in the last six months, (3) tried to negotiate a lower price with their supplier in the last six months, and (4) offered special prices to attract more clients in the last six months. Set to missing if the respondent does not answer any of the four questions.

- **Work Hours**: Number of hours per week the respondent takes care of her business personally. In case the respondent has no business, we replace it with 0.

- **Goal Setting**: Score that can take values between 0 and 3. The goal-setting score depends on the number of "yes" responses to the questions: (1) have a goal for how much profit they want to make in the next month, (2) have a goal for how much profit they want to make in the next year, and (3) know how much they can spend in business

expenses in the next year. Set to missing if the respondent does not answer any of the three questions.

- **Business Practices Index**: Summary index constructed following M. L. Anderson (2008), aggregating all business practices outcomes listed above. The index is constructed using the `swindex` command in Stata.

D.4 Non-Business Outcomes

D.4.1 Investment

- **Savings**: The monthly amount the respondent reports saving, measured in UGX. We winsorize savings at the 99th percentile. For respondents reporting daily savings amounts, we multiply by 30.5 to construct a monthly savings measure. We use the midpoint of intervals whenever the respondent cannot provide an exact amount, and set the variable to missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer. When the respondent reports not saving or not having a business, we replace this variable with 0.

- **Business Investment**: Binary indicator equal to one if the respondent reports having made any investment in her business in the last six months, and zero otherwise.

- **Investment Index**: Summary index constructed following M. L. Anderson (2008), aggregating all investment outcomes. The index is constructed using the `swindex` command in Stata.

D.4.2 Psychometric Measures

- **Locus of Control - Internal**: Score that can take values between 4 and 20. The internality score depends on the sum of the questions: (1) when I make plans, I am

almost certain to make them work, (2) I am usually able to protect my personal interests, (3) when I get what I want, it is usually because I worked hard for it, and (4) my life is determined by my own actions. All questions are on a scale of 1–5, where one is "disagree a lot" and five is "agree a lot". Higher responses indicate greater levels of agreement with statements indicating high levels of internality. We have no missing responses for these questions.

- **Locus of Control - PO**: Score that can take values between 5 and 25. The powerful others score depends on the sum of the questions: (1) I feel like what happens in my life is mostly determined by powerful people, (2) my life is chiefly controlled by powerful others, (3) people like myself have very little chance of protecting our personal interests when they conflict with those of strong pressure groups, (4) getting what I want requires pleasing those people above me, and (5) in order to have my plans work, I make sure that they fit in with the desires of people who have power over me. All questions are on a scale of 1–5 where one is "disagree a lot" and five is "agree a lot". Higher responses indicate greater levels of agreement with statements indicating high levels of belief that powerful others control the respondent's life. We multiply all variables by -1 so that higher scores indicate a more internalized locus of control. We have no missing responses for these questions.

- **Locus of Control - Chance**: Score that can take values between 5 and 25. The chance score depends on the sum of the questions: (1) to a great extent my life is controlled by accidental happenings, (2) often there is no chance of protecting my personal interests from bad luck happenings, (3) when I get what I want, it's usually because I'm lucky, (4) I have often found that what is going to happen will happen, and (5) it's not always wise for me to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune. All questions are on a scale of 1–5 where one is "disagree a lot" and five is "agree a lot". Higher responses indicate greater levels of agreement with statements indicating that many things in life are due to chance, so we multiply all variables by -1

so that higher scores then indicate a more internalized/self-driven locus of control. We add up the five questions to generate a chance score for each participant. We have no missing responses for these questions.

- **Grit**: Score that can take values between 8 and 40. The grit score depends on the sum of the questions: (1) I stay interested in my goals, even if they take a long time (months or years) to complete, (2) I think about my work even in my dreams and daydreams, (3) I work very hard. I keep working when others stop to take a break, (4) setbacks do not discourage me. I do not give up easily, (5) every day, I try to do one thing better than I did the day before, (6) I am constantly asking other people for feedback about how I can improve, (7) I am never fully satisfied with my performance, and (8) I finish whatever I begin. All questions are on a scale of 1–5, where one is "not at all like me" and five is "completely like me." Higher responses correspond to higher levels of grit. We have no missing responses for these questions.

- **Self-Efficacy**: Score that can take values between 10 and 50. The self-efficacy score depends on the sum of the questions: (1) I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough, (2) if someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get what I want, (3) it is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals, (4) I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events, (5) thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen situations, (6) I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort, (7) I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my coping abilities, (8) When I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several solutions, (9) if I am in trouble, I can usually think of a solution, and (10) I can usually handle whatever comes my way. All questions are on a scale of 1–5, where one is "not at all like me" and five is "completely like me." Higher responses correspond to higher levels of self-efficacy. We have no missing responses for these questions.

- **Income Aspirations**: Difference between the reported values to the questions (1) "What income do you want to have per month in 10 years?" and (2) "What income do you currently have per month?" We winsorize income aspirations at the 99th percentile.

- **Social Status Aspirations**: Difference between the reported values in a scale from the questions: (1) "What level of social status do you want to have in 10 years?" and (2) "What level of social status do you have today?". The level of social status was selected from the image of a ladder by the participants, enumerated from 0 to 9.

- **Education Aspirations**: Ordered categorical variable capturing the respondent's desired level of education for her children, elicited through the question: "What level of education do you think your children to have?" Higher values correspond to higher educational attainment aspirations. This variable is set to missing if the respondent answers "don't know."

- **Psychometric Index**: Summary index constructed following M. L. Anderson (2008), aggregating all psychometric outcomes. The index is constructed using the `swindex` command in Stata.

D.4.3 Consumption

- **Participant Household Expenditure Contribution**: Continuous variable measuring the respondent's total daily contribution to household expenditures, based on the respondent's best guess. We winsorize this variable at the 99th percentile.

- **Spouse Household Expenditure Contribution**: Continuous variable measuring the respondent's reported total daily contribution of her spouse to household expenditures, based on the respondent's best guess. We winsorize this variable at the 99th percentile.

- **Other Household Members' Expenditure Contribution**: Continuous variable

measuring the respondent's reported total daily contribution of all other household members (excluding the respondent and her spouse) to household expenditures, based on the respondent's best guess. We winsorize this variable at the 99th percentile.

- **Participant Expenditure on Frequently Purchased Items**: Continuous variable measuring the respondent's total daily contribution toward frequently purchased household items, based on the respondent's best guess. We winsorize this variable at the 99th percentile.

- **Spouse Expenditure on Frequently Purchased Items**: Continuous variable measuring the respondent's reported total daily contribution of her spouse toward frequently purchased household items, based on the respondent's best guess. We winsorize this variable at the 99th percentile.

- **Other Household Members' Expenditure on Frequently Purchased Items**: Continuous variable measuring the respondent's reported total daily contribution of other household members toward frequently purchased household items, based on the respondent's best guess. We winsorize this variable at the 99th percentile.

- **Participant Expenditure on Infrequently Purchased Items**: Continuous variable measuring the respondent's total daily contribution toward infrequently purchased and large or investment-related household items, based on the respondent's best guess. We winsorize this variable at the 99th percentile.

- **Spouse Expenditure on Infrequently Purchased Items**: Continuous variable measuring the respondent's reported total daily contribution of her spouse toward infrequently purchased and large or investment-related household items, based on the respondent's best guess. We winsorize this variable at the 99th percentile.

- **Other Household Members' Expenditure on Infrequently Purchased Items**: Continuous variable measuring the respondent's reported total daily contribution of

other household members toward infrequently purchased and large or investment-related household items, based on the respondent's best guess. We winsorize this variable at the 99th percentile.

- **Remittances**: Continuous variable measuring net remittances sent or received by the household, as reported by the respondent. We winsorize this variable at the 99th percentile.

- **Marginal Utility of Expenditure (MUE)**: Continuous variable measuring the marginal utility of expenditure, calculated using household consumption expenditures over the past week on seventeen food items, following the methodology outlined in Ligon (2020). We winsorize this variable at the 99th percentile. Higher values indicate higher marginal utilities of expenditure and correspond to households being worse off.

- **Consumption Index**: Summary index constructed following M. L. Anderson (2008), aggregating all consumption outcomes listed above. The index is constructed using the `swindex` command in Stata.

D.4.4 Network Centrality

- **In Degree**: Continuous variable measuring the number of incoming ties to the respondent's node in the directed social network. Higher values indicate that the respondent is named or referenced by more alters.

- **Out Degree**: Continuous variable measuring the number of outgoing ties from the respondent's node in the directed social network. Higher values indicate that the respondent names or references more alters.

- **Centrality of Most Central Link**: Continuous variable measuring the highest eigenvector centrality among alters in the respondent's network. This variable captures the

importance of the most central woman with whom the respondent is connected, where importance is measured by eigenvector centrality.

- **Eigenvector Centrality**: Continuous variable measuring the extent to which the respondent is connected to alters who themselves are well-connected in the network. Higher values indicate greater connections to influential or central alters.

- **Networks Index**: Summary index constructed following M. L. Anderson (2008), aggregating In-Degree, Out-Degree, and the Centrality of the Most Central Link. The index excludes the respondent's own eigenvector centrality. The index is constructed using the `swindex` command in Stata.

D.5 Exploratory Outcomes

- **Help Family**: Binary indicator equal to one if the respondent reports having used savings to help family or friends, and zero otherwise.

- **Household Expenses**: Binary indicator equal to one if the respondent reports having used savings to pay for household expenses, and zero otherwise.

- **Weddings & Events**: Binary indicator equal to one if the respondent reports having used savings to finance weddings, funerals, or other social events, and zero otherwise.

- **Robbed (Last 6 Months)**: Binary indicator equal to one if the respondent reports having been robbed in the six months prior to the survey, and zero otherwise.

- **Difference in Spouse and Woman's Estimate of Woman's Monthly Earnings**: Continuous variable measuring the difference between the spouse's estimate and the respondent's own estimate of the respondent's monthly earnings. Positive values indicate that the spouse reports higher earnings for the respondent than the respondent reports herself.

D.6 Intrahousehold Outcomes

D.6.1 Household Decision-Making

- **Control Participant's Earnings**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers you or you and your husband/partner jointly to the question, "Who usually decides how the money you earn will be used?", zero if the respondent answers your husband/partner or other and missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer.

- **Control Spouse's Earnings**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers you or you and your husband/partner jointly to the question, "Who usually decides how the money your husband/partner earns will be used?", zero if the respondent answers your husband/partner or other and missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer.

- **Women working**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers you or you and your husband/partner jointly to the question, "Who usually makes decisions about whether you will work?", zero if the respondent answers your husband/partner or other and missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer.

- **Joint account**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers yes to the question, "Do you have any joint accounts with your husband? For instance, an account at a bank, SACCO, etc?", zero if the respondent answers no and missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer.

- **Use of Savings**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers you or you and your husband/partner jointly to the question, "Who usually makes decisions about making major household purchases?", zero if the respondent answers your husband/partner or other and missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer.

D.6.2 Intimate Partner Violence

- **Abuse Index - Ever**: Score that can take values between 0 and 13. The abused index score depends on the number of "yes" responses to the questions: (1) insulted you or made you feel bad about yourself, (2) belittled or humiliated you in front of other people, (3) did things to scare or intimidate you on purpose, (4) threatened to hurt you or someone you care about, (5) slapped you or thrown something at you that could hurt you, (6) pushed you or shoved you, (7) hit you with his fist or with something else that could hurt you, (8) kicked you, dragged you, or beaten you up, (9) choked or burnt you on purpose, (10) threatened to use or actually used a gun, knife, or other weapon against you, (11) physically forced you to have sexual intercourse with him when you did not want do, (12) did you ever have sexual intercourse you did not want because you were afraid or what he might do, and (13) did he ever force you to do something sexual that you found degrading or humiliating. Set to missing if the respondent does not answer any of the thirteen questions. Higher scores correspond to higher levels of intimate partner violence.

- **Abuse Index - Last 12 months**: Score that can take values between 0 and 13. The abused index (12 months) score depends on the number of "yes" responses to the question "has this happened in the past 12 months?", that is asked after each of the questions that are part of the abused index. Set to missing if the respondent does not answer any of the thirteen questions. Higher scores correspond to higher levels of intimate partner violence.

- **Has Been Abused - Ever**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers yes to any questions of the abused index. It is zero if the respondent answers no to all questions and missing if the respondent does not know or answers not to all questions. Higher scores correspond to higher levels of intimate partner violence.

- **Has Been Abused - Last 12 months**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent

answers yes to any questions that are part of the abused index (12 months). It is zero if the respondent answers no to all questions and missing if the respondent does not know or answers not to all questions. Higher scores correspond to higher levels of intimate partner violence.

D.6.3 Individual Questions of the Abused Index

- **Insulted**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers yes to the question if her husband/partner has ever "insulted you or made you feel bad about yourself", zero if the respondent answers no, and missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer.
- **Humillated**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers yes to the question if her husband/partner has ever "belittled or humiliated you in front of other people", zero if the respondent answers no, and missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer.
- **Intimated**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers yes to the question if her husband/partner has ever "did things to scare or intimidate you on purpose", zero if the respondent answers no, and missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer.
- **Threatened**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers yes to the question if her husband/partner has ever "threatened to hurt you or someone you care about", zero if the respondent answers no, and missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer.
- **Slapped**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers yes to the question if her husband/partner has ever "slapped you or thrown something at you that could hurt you", zero if the respondent answers no, and missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer.

- **Pushed**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers yes to the question if her husband/partner has ever "pushed you or shoved you", zero if the respondent answers no, and missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer.

- **Hit you**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers yes to the question if her husband/partner has ever "hit you with his fist or with something else that could hurt you", zero if the respondent answers no, and missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer.

- **Kicked or dragged**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers yes to the question if her husband/partner has ever "kicked you, dragged you, or beaten you up", zero if the respondent answers no, and missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer.

- **Choked or burnt**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers yes to the question if her husband/partner has ever "choked or burnt you on purpose", zero if the respondent answers no, and missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer.

- **Used weapons**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers yes to the question if her husband/partner has ever "threatened to use or actually used a gun, knife, or other weapon against you", zero if the respondent answers no, and missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer.

- **Forced Intercourse**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers yes to the question if her husband/partner has ever "physically forced you to have sexual intercourse with him when you did not want do", zero if the respondent answers no, and missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer.

- **Sex under intimidation**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers yes to the question if her husband/partner has ever "did you ever have sexual intercourse

you did not want because you were afraid or what he might do", zero if the respondent answers no, and missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer.

- **Degrading sexual acts**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent answers yes to the question if her husband/partner has ever "did he ever force you to do something sexual that you found degrading or humiliating", zero if the respondent answers no, and missing if the respondent does not know or chooses not to answer.

D.6.4 Attitudes Towards IPV

- **Wife Attitudes Index**: Continuous variable equal to the aggregate score of traditional wife attitudes, which includes items on gender roles and marital relations. Higher values indicate more traditional views toward women's roles in marriage and family life.

- **Attitudes about IPV Index**: Continuous variable equal to the aggregate score of attitudes regarding the acceptability of intimate partner violence under specific circumstances. Higher values indicate greater acceptance of IPV.

- **Sex Refusal Score**: Continuous variable equal to the aggregate score of attitudes regarding whether a woman can refuse to have sex with her husband under specific circumstances. Higher values indicate less willingness to refuse sex.

- **Controlling Behavior Index**: Continuous variable equal to the aggregate score of behaviors indicating control by the respondent's current or most recent husband/partner, such as trying to limit her contact with friends or family, monitoring her whereabouts, restricting her access to healthcare, or displaying jealousy. Higher values indicate more controlling behavior by the spouse.

- **Told Anyone**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent reports having told anyone about the abuse.

- **Sought Authorities**: Binary variable equal to one if the respondent reports having sought help from authorities (i.e. police, hospital or health center, court, local leader, religious leaders) regarding the abuse.

D.6.5 Partnership Decisions

- **Partnered**: Binary variable equal to one if the participant reported being married or cohabiting. Otherwise, it takes the value of zero.
- **Divorced after Baseline**: Binary variable equal to one if the participant reported being married or cohabiting at baseline but reported being divorced afterward. Otherwise, it takes the value of zero.

D.7 Spillovers

- **Any Link to Treated Women**: Continuous variable measuring the total number of treated women the participant recognizes from the location's photobook used during the survey. This measure is constructed separately by coaching modality (home visits and venue-based coaching).
- **Friendship Link to Treated Women**: Continuous variable measuring the total number of treated women the participant recognizes from the location's photobook used during the survey and describes as friends. This measure is constructed separately by coaching modality (home visits and venue-based coaching).
- **Business Link to Treated Women**: Continuous variable measuring the total number of treated women the participant recognizes from the location's photobook used during the survey and reports conducting business with. This measure is constructed separately by coaching modality (home visits and venue-based coaching).